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Countries: Controlling Migration and Hybrid Model 
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Abstract 
This study investigates migration flows from Western Balkans and North African countries to 
the high-income countries of the EU. Migration and asylum issues were analysed with taking 
into account empirical, analytical and political comparisons of Western Balkans and North 
African countries from the triple win solution point of view. The research attempts to 
emphasize Western Balkans migration experience in order to respond how to manage 
and/or control chaotic migration with respect to North African countries. In addition, the EU 
enlargement and neighbourhood policies have significant effects on EU migration dynamics 
of demographic change (i.e. ageing population) and convergence/divergence of EU member 
states’ migration priorities. In this context, the role of the triangle (hybridity) – state, private 
and civil society in migration research ought to be argued to verify whether a controlling 
migration by an ideal hybrid structure and decentralisation will be more effective and 
accurate or not? The research presents dialectics of triple win approach and hybrid model 
(i.e. home country-state, host country-private, and civil society-migrants) with using 
governance models. The main argument was tested methodologically through using case 
study research, grounded theory, constructivist and normative approaches. 
Keywords: Hybrid Model, Controlling Migration, Social Transformation, Western Balkans, 
North Africa, Decentralisation 
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1 Introduction 
Migration and asylum are very sensitive issues which should be considered with the 
European values such as; democratisation, fairness, antidiscrimination, protection of human 
rights, and enhancing liberty in the context of the EU law. With respect to the European 
values, the EU has created policies and structured the EU supranational law which has 
legally binding force for all member states. The EU started to shape a common migration 
policy with Maastricht Treaty which ensured a ground to structure intergovernmental 
cooperation. Then, the Amsterdam Treaty put it a step further and included migration 
policies at the Union level (Community Pillar Title IV) and the Schengen Agreement into 
acquis communitaire. In Title V, The Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) has transformed the 
intergovernmental cooperation to transgovernmental cooperation which covers the Union, 
member states and the third countries (Bia 2004; Faist and Ette 2007). Likewise, the TFEU 
has centralised the power at Union level for more effective migration policies and the 
centralisation to Brussels has provided convergence and divergence in various migration 
issues. At national level, the EU respects all member states’ own constitutions and 
regulations because all member states have their sovereignty rights and some member 
states which suffer from a high migration and asylum flows, are referring to their national 
law and regulations. In addition, the EU attaches considerable attention to the bilateral and 
multilateral relations/agreements (e.g. visa policy, cooperation with countries on illegal 
migration flows and back illegal migrant agreements). These relations and agreements are 
necessary and precondition for regional cooperation and enlargement policy. Thus, the 
Western Balkans and North Africa appear as two regions which have high priorities. 
Recently, the EU has given many rights (i.e. visa liberalisations, social and cultural funds, 
financial aids and so forth) particularly to the Western Balkan countries. Approving Croatia 
as twenty-eighth EU member state, giving candidate status to Serbia, starting visa 
liberalisation talks with Kosovo, helping Albania to achieve interparty agreement 
(government-opposition) and political stability and many other positive outcomes ought to 
be perceived as a great success of the EU efforts. In addition, the EU adopted the 
Immigration and Asylum Pact in 2008 to consolidate its efforts towards a common migration 
and integration policy and also to deal with North African migration flows. This policy is 
based on an agreement between member states to apply common principles in the field of 
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migration and asylum. Moreover, in 2010, the European Council approved the Stockholm 
Programme which covers the period 2010-2014. Furthermore, the EU places a high priority 
on the Lisbon Agenda’s aim to create a knowledge-based society. In this context, 
Europeanisation1 is emphasized on security, the human rights legislation and the 
development of restrictive migration policies in the EU. From the perspective of free 
movement of persons and workers as fundamental rights which are guaranteed by the EU 
law, the Schengen regulations bring a paradox regarding migration and asylum issues. The 
judicial complaints, debates and sceptic attitudes in France, Italy, Germany and Spain 
against migration policies and Schengen regulations have illustrated this fact perfectly (see 
Table A1 for Schengen visa statistics). In 2009, only these four countries have received 
approximately half of the total Schengen visas (4709491 visas, 49.02 per cent of total visas) 
in Schengen zone. Therefore, the harmonisation of EU migration policy and new approaches 
were examined for finding out whether the EU puts barriers to the free movement of 
persons and workers of non-EU citizens (i.e. the citizens of Western Balkan and North 
African countries) or not. For the Western Balkan countries visa liberalisations have 
provided overstay of migrants and asylum applications. However, what differs Western 
Balkans from the North African countries is that all Western Balkan countries’ (currently 
except Kosovo) citizens are allowed to enter any EU member state without a visa for 
maximum 90 days and 180 day in a year and they move to any member state within this 
process. Whereas the North African countries’ citizens generally have refugee status waiting 
for enjoying their asylum right because of the repressive political regimes and internal 
conflicts in their countries. The matters lay on the circulation within the Schengen zone. For 
instance, immigrants who want to establish their lives with their families in France, are not 
allowed to use Italy as transit country through applying for international protection right. 
Generally, the Schengen states are sending back immigrants to the previous country from 
where they have entered (i.e. first asylum principle). In addition, international law and 
national regulations have many system blanks which are filled in by human smugglers and 
                                                          
1
 Europeanisation can be understood in terms of a limited set of ordinary processes of change (or 
transformation for engagement). The term Europeanisation involves the changes in external boundaries, 
developing institutions at the European level, central penetration of national systems of governance, exporting 
forms of political organisation and a political unification project (Olsen 2002). According to Wallace, 
Europeanisation is the development and sustaining of systematic European arrangements to manage cross-
border connections, such that a European dimension becomes an embedded feature which frames politics and 
policy within the European states (Wallace 2000: 370). 
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illegal migrants. Therefore, hard law regulations have illustrated the fact that illegal 
migrants cannot do anything else until they guarantee better living standards for their 
families. That means researchers and policy makers should reconsider alternative ways to 
tackle with illegal migration issues. In this context, the study investigates the fundamental 
reasons through using empirical data and attempts to propose a hybrid model that covers 
the active participations of state, private, civil society actors in order to embed hybridity in 
migration and asylum research, and respond to migration issues with a controlling migration 
approach which is based on theoretical assumptions and practical reasons and consists of 
migration driving forces; such as legal regulations, capacity building, remittances, hybrid 
organisations, labour policy of states, economic and political motives, symmetric and 
asymmetric networks. Moreover, there are interrelationships and dialectics among triple 
win model (home country, host country and migrants) and hybrid model, i.e. state-home 
country nexus, private-host country nexus and migrants-civil society nexus. Furthermore, 
hybrid model has a catalyst role in terms of balancing social problems and civil society 
needs. Therefore, it is better to perceive the hybrid model a combination of communicative 
and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition 
for significant functionality. The main research question is ‘how hybridity can be embedded 
in migration and asylum research and what is the role and influence of the decentralisation 
process? Supportive follow up questions are as such: Can hybridity be an effective solution 
for better control and manage migration and asylum matters? Is a controlling migration 
approach which consists of alternative and innovative soft law regulations, an accurate 
model or strategy for embeddedness of general/real or specific/ideal hybridisation in 
migration and asylum research? How can classical migration theories be reformulated or 
reconsidered in the context of hybridisation of migration issues in public sphere with 
governance via governments’ participation? What are the implications of hybridisation for 
an ideal triple win solution and why states ought to include decentralisation process as a 
hybridisation tool for better managing and controlling migration?  
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2 Methodology and Background 
The argument of this study was structured with applications of the third way approach 
(Giddens 2000) and the theory of structuration, the theory of communicative action (Die 
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns) – Labour, Family, Media and Language interactions 
(Habermas 1990) and theory-practice understanding. Hybrid model can be an effective 
strategy for social transformation of controlling migration approach, and in order to link the 
transition to the praxis of social transformation, paradigmatic and philosophical critical 
approaches (Apel 2011) were included to the research. Rather starting with a hypothesis, in 
this study the main hypothesis will be verified (or falsified) at the end of the research. 
Eisenhardt’s technique which means doing an empirical study with a special focus to data 
and then generating theory or theoretical model (Eisenhardt 1989: 549), was used in order 
to conduct research in the context of grounded theory. In other words, this study attempts 
to create a transition from practice to theory and hence the grounded theory method (GTM) 
was used to highlight how data and analysis, methodologically, become constructed. First, 
the data of two regions were reached up to construct abstractions and then down to tie 
these abstractions to data. Starting with the EU and Western Balkans relations and in this 
framework, countries’ political relations and empirical migration data include both the 
specific and the general concepts were investigated in order to explore their links to larger 
issues or creating larger unrecognised issues in entirety. Thus, GTM in migration research 
can provide a route to see beyond the obvious and a path to reach imaginative 
interpretations (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007: 13). Meanwhile, GTM is categorised as an 
inductive method which is a type of reasoning that begins with study of a range of individual 
cases and extrapolates from them to form a conceptual category. In this context, one of the 
concerns often expressed by researchers is when to stop collecting data and how to balance 
the comparison analysis among two regions or many countries? A researcher stops when 
there is no need to continue, i.e. ‘achieving the point of theoretical saturation’ (Bryant and 
Charmaz, 2007: 281). The constant comparison of interchangeable indicators in the data 
yields the properties and dimensions of each category, or concept. This process of constant 
comparison continues until no new properties or dimensions are emerging. At this point, a 
concept has been theoretically saturated. 
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Initially, the research presents a comparison of Western Balkans and North African 
countries, and then with normative, theoretical and philosophical perspectives, the section 
four constructs controlling migration and hybrid model within the framework of two case 
comparisons and dialectics of triple win and hybrid model. 
Why the Western Balkans and North African countries were chosen for a comparison 
analysis which tests migration flows, decentralisation and hybridisation? Geographically, the 
two regions were examined as a comparative case study because the EU has integration and 
neighbourhood policies for these two regions. The first region, the Western Balkans, 
consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, 
and Serbia. Croatia was excluded because of achieving a certain date (i.e. mid-2013) for 
being the twenty-eighth member state of the EU. All other Western Balkan states have put 
the full membership objective as ultimate achievement on their national agenda. Thus for 
the EU the most crucial point is the development process in these states and efforts for 
achieving EU standards. Of course, achieving EU standards is not possible with merely 
national capital and state development plans. The European capital flows and direct 
investments will enhance collaboration with state actors and philanthropic actions with civil 
society in Western Balkans. The other region is North Africa. In fact, it is also known as 
Southern Mediterranean region or the Maghreb. However, the research stresses the recent 
events in North Africa. Therefore, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia were included 
to the analyses as North African countries (excluding Sudan, Mauritania and Western 
Sahara). The EU has neighbourhood policies with North African countries and in this context 
the partnership relations will accelerate hybridisation and decentralisation process in North 
Africa. From international migration point of view, both cases are sui generis and linked to 
each other. The European Commission has been published many analytical reports and 
strategy papers for particularly these countries of two regions. Therefore, from the 
European Union perspective, these two regions have a very high priority for pursuing the EU 
2020 targets and enhancing the development process both internally in the EU and 
externally in Western Balkans and North Africa. In addition, the distance among the EU and 
these two regions is a factor that distinguishes these two regions from other regions of the 
world. The EU considers the relationship with these two regions as both strategy and 
security cycle. Most of migration influxes to the EU come from the countries of these two 
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regions and that’s why the hybrid model proposed is significant and it will be an effective 
strategy for the EU enlargement, integration, stability, and development processes. 
To support and improve hybrid model, the author has participated in various conferences in 
European Parliament and European Commission such as the conference of Mr. Andrew 
Rasbash, Head of Unit: Institutional building, TAIEX, TWINNING, that was entitled ‘The EU’s 
Enlargement Policy’ and the conference of Mr. Jordi Garcia Martinez, the Policy Officer – 
Visa Policy, which was entitled ‘The EU’s Asylum Policy’. Author has also participated in a 
conference which is entitled ‘Habermas und der Historische Materialismus.’ The conference 
was organised on 23-25/03/2012 and Emeritus Prof.Dr.Karl-Otto Apel (Universität Frankfurt 
am Main), Emeritus Prof.Dr.Jürgen Habermas (Universität Frankfurt am Main) and many 
other social scientists have participated as speakers and listeners at Bergische Universität 
Wuppertal in Germany. The author achieved the opportunity and honour to discuss 
hybridity issue with Prof.Dr.Karl-Otto Apel at the end of the conference. Moreover, the 
author has improved the hybridity notion and application from two cases i.e. Heidelberg 
Intercultural Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) and ASAN - Albanian Students 
Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve Shqiptarë në Botë). The author has realised an in-depth 
interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the Foreigners’ & Migrants’ 
Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). The outcomes of the in-depth 
interview were very significant in terms of the EU integration and development processes 
and explains how hybrid structures just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center as a hybrid 
case are likely to spread and networked in the future. 
Eventually, the information was mostly collected from the World Bank databases, the 
European Commission and the International Organisation for Migration published reports in 
order to analyse each state and region separately and then compare the illustrations for 
finding out similarities and differences among each other. 
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3 The Empirical Comparison of Western Balkans and North African Countries 
3.1. General Overview of the EU and Western Balkan Relations 
After the collapse of Soviet Union and since the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, the emerging 
countries in the Western Balkans have endured a painful set of multiple transitions. 
Countries in the region shared almost the same fate during this period. For stabilisation of 
the Balkan peninsula, the European Union created Stabilisation Association Process2 (SAP) 
and during this process signed Stabilisation Association Agreements (SAAs) with each 
Western Balkan country. Thus, we can put forward that there is a nexus between European 
Union’s political attitude and stabilisation and development of Western Balkan region as a 
whole. The EU wants to prevent itself from illegal migration flows and hence works in order 
to ensure stabilisation and development to the Western Balkan countries. It is assumed that 
the integration of Western Balkan countries within the European Union will effectively 
stabilise the region. In addition, the European Commission is giving a crucial priority to 
Western Balkans integration within the EU because th  EU shares common cultural and 
historical values with these countries. If we focus on the region, we can recognise that the 
Western Balkans had already become a part of Europe in different dimensions. Therefore, 
initially, the EU is respecting the Western Balkan countries’ applications in order to approve 
them as full member states of the EU in the near future. However, political situations and 
decisions in various countries in this region make the negotiation process more complicated. 
The integration process of Western Balkans is strongly related to governments’ foreign 
policies, implementation of reforms and achieving European standards. In 2003, the EU 
declared that the future of the Balkans is within the European Union. However, the results 
of the French and Dutch referendums on the Constitutional Treaty caused the EU to shift to 
a more restrictive enlargement strategy. With the Thessaloniki Summit the European 
Council attempted to develop a common policy on illegal immigration, external borders, the 
return of illegal migrants and cooperation with third countries (Council of the European 
Union 2003: 3). Since the enlargement of 1 May 2004, the EU and the Western Balkans have 
become even closer neighbours and the EU’s desire for a common migration policy was 
increased (European Commission 2005: 3). Recently, the EU has been debating about the 
                                                          
2
 The SAP pursues three aims, namely stabilisation and a swift transition to a market economy, the promotion 
of regional cooperation and the prospect of EU accession (European Commission 2007a: 14). 
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inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen Zone. The border reforms of these 
countries are going slowly and therefore the European Union expects to include these 
countries to the Schengen Zone until 2015. However, the Netherlands has opposed the 
inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen Zone because of not achieving required 
EU standards in various areas. Thus, it is in the best interest of all of Europe to promote 
democratic transformation and transition to required EU standards in the Western Balkan 
countries in order to consolidate stability (European Commission 2007a: 16).  
In the light of these considerations, for the integration of Western Balkans within the EU, 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria is not the merely set of requirements and conditions for 
the EU accession. The best example of this is Macedonia which had the best prospects for 
being accepted by the EU. The problem that slowed the accession process and negotiations 
down was the issue of the dispute over the name of the country with Greece (Slovak 
Atlantic Commission 2010: 1). Obviously, that means the EU will not allow a country 
hindered by serious bilateral political or other problems to join its structures. It is necessary 
to present and communicate the inevitable political and economic reforms awaited from 
the Western Balkan countries as to be made foremost in favour of their internal 
stabilisation, then in favour of the EU accession. The EU’s strategy for the Western Balkans 
contained a number of key elements3 which flow through and dictate dealings with 
potential candidate countries. These are as follows (Brown and Attenborough 2007: 10): 
Tailored Country Strategies, Regional Cooperation and Conditionality. However, some key 
challenges for EU regarding the Western Balkan countries’ integration process are listed as 
such: a) Increased focus on strengthening the rule of law and public administration reform; 
b) Ensuring freedom of expression in the media; c) Enhancing regional cooperation and 
reconciliation in the Western Balkans; d) Achieving sustainable economic recovery and 
embracing Europe 2020; e) Extending transport and energy networks (European 
Commission 2011b). 
For development of the Western Balkan countries and dealing with issues stated above, the 
Commission provides financial and technical support to the enlargement countries for their 
                                                          
3
 Each country will progress towards the goal of accession based on its own merits, irrespective of how other 
countries in the region are progressing. Regional cooperation is based on a recognition that the Western 
Balkans as a whole needs to improve intrapolitical and economic relations, good neighbourliness if each 
individual country is to move forward (European Commission 2005: 4). 
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preparation for accession. Assistance is provided essentially under the Instrument for Pre-
Accession Assistance (IPA), under which total allocation over the period 2007-2013 is € 11.6 
billion. 
In this context, the integration of the Western Balkan countries and migration issues in 
these countries are strongly interrelated because the EU has a very high number of migrants 
whose origin countries are at this region. Generally, the typology of entry of migrants from 
these countries differ widely between member states. While family reunification is 
considerable in some countries, like Austria, France or Sweden, other member states, like 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and UK, had a high percentage of work-related immigration 
(European Commission 2007b: 3). Moreover The cooperation on migration policy issues 
between Western Balkan countries and the EU is part of the Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAP) as the overarching theme of EU relations with the Western Balkans. Relevant 
to the migration issues, the Western Balkans have seen mass migration flows, including 
illegal migration and human trafficking (Kathuria 2008). 
In addition, Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) specified common asylum, immigration and border control 
policy objectives with Article 67, 78, and 79 in Title V (i.e. Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice). There are projects which might turn out the realistic view to an ideal type for 
Western Balkan countries; such as the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). 
SEECP, a forum for regional cooperation, is involved in the process of creating a new 
regional framework, which will be the regionally owned successor of the Stability Pact for 
South Eastern Europe (European Commission 2007c: 5). These projects have not only 
optimistic means for immigrants but also are desirable for asylum seekers. The Balkans 
affects directly or indirectly most of the EU reforms in the field of asylum. The efficacy of 
governments in the region to implement legislative and administrative reforms, absorb 
projects and financial support, and establish institutions is a crucial element for the success 
of EU reform (Peshkopia 2005: 237). However, a challenge is that the EU and the UNHCR are 
not in complete agreement regarding interests, concepts and actions about asylum systems 
in the Balkans. 
Another aspect of integration process is the perception of the EU upon migration and 
asylum issues. On the one side, legal migration plays an important role in enhancing the 
knowledge-based economy in Europe, in advancing economic development, and thus 
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contributing to the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy (Council of the European Union 
2004: 19). On the other side, illegal migration is a deliberate act intended to gain entry into, 
residence or employment in the territory of a state, contrary to the rules and conditions 
applicable in that state (Europol 2007: 5). The EU encourages legal migration particularly 
skilled workers of Western Balkan countries, whereas creates policies in order to fight 
against illegal migration. Basically for the EU, cooperation in matters of immigration and 
asylum is one of the most recently addressed aspects of the Western Balkan integration 
within the EU (Lavenex 2009: 1). The European Council emphasizes the need for intensified 
cooperation and capacity building to enable the EU member states that are neighbours to 
Western Balkan countries better to manage migration and to provide adequate protection 
for asylum seekers4. Support for capacity building in national asylum systems, border 
control and wider cooperation on migration issues will be provided to those countries that 
demonstrate a genuine commitment to fulfil their obligations under the Geneva Convention 
on Refugees (Council of the European Union 2004: 22). It should be noted that some asylum 
applicants may remain in a country on a temporary or permanent basis even if they are not 
deemed to be refugees under the 1951 Convention definition (e.g. asylum applicants may 
be granted subsidiary protection or humanitarian protection statuses). Furthermore, 
traditionally, migrant and/or asylum seeker sending countries have been seen as part of the 
integration problem associated with immigrants, and partnerships with third countries have 
been largely framed to prevent or control unwanted migration (Kirişçi 2009: 119). In May 
2006, the Council of the European Union adopted an Action Oriented Paper (AOP) on 
improving cooperation on organised crime, corruption, illegal migration and counter-
terrorism between the EU, Western Balkans and other ENP (European Neighbourhood 
Policy) countries (Europol 2007: 5). The Council invited Europol and Frontex to determine 
the high risk routes5 in the Western Balkan countries. As a consequence, the Western 
Balkans is a region of origin for illegal migrants into the European Union, but also a transit 
region for migrants from other parts of the world. 
                                                          
4
 In this respect, asylum applications refer to all persons who apply on an individual basis for asylum or similar 
protection, irrespective of whether they lodge their application on arrival or from inside the country, and 
irrespective of whether they entered the country legally or illegally (Eurostat 2010: 199). 
5
 With respect to this basic issue, the main high risk routes that have been identified originate in Albania and 
pass through either Kosovo-Serbia-Croatia or through Montenegro-Serbia-Croatia, towards Slovenia, Hungary 
or Italy. The exact routes vary depending on changes in policy and countermeasures undertaken by the 
Western Balkan countries (Europol 2007: 2). 
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3.2. Country Analyses: Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia 
With an approximately 3.1 million6 total population (Republika e Shqipërisë Instituti i 
Statistikës 2010), Albania represents the most dramatic instance of postcommunist 
migration (UNDP 2010: 2). The Albanian Department of Emigration within the Albanian 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs data related to Albanian emigration figures are 
specified as; 1 million immigrants from approximately population of 3.1 million inhabitants; 
22-25 per cent of the total population; 35 per cent of active population; Albanian migratory 
flows 5-6 times higher than those in comparable developing countries, concerning the active 
population (Ministria e Punës, Çështjeve Sociale dhe Shanseve Të Barabarta 2010a). 
According to World Bank Albania bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total 
number of migrants in host countries is 1438451. During the transition period, Albania 
experienced a steady increase in the number of emigrants living abroad (Castaldo Litchfield 
and Reilly 2005: 157). In addition, the scale of internal migration has induced a radical 
demographic transformation within the country. However, for a sizeable portion of internal 
migrants, the process represents a prelude to an external move. For instance; In Greece 
(2003), according to the European Commission's Annual Report on Statistics of Migration, 
Asylum and Returns, the number of living and working Albanian citizens is 434810. In Italy 
(2006), ISTAT and the Italian Office of Statistics registered 348813 living and working 
Albanian citizens. In the U.S. (2005), according to general census of population, the number 
of living and working Albanian citizens is 113661. In the UK (2005), government report 
included 50 thousand living and working Albanian citizens. In Canada (2001), according to 
general census of population, the number of living and working Albanian citizens is 14935. 
In Germany (2002), Federal Statistical Office confirmed 11630 living and working Albanian 
citizens (Ministria e Punës, Çështjeve Sociale dhe Shanseve Të Barabarta 2010b). Despite 
the fact that Greece and Italy remain the main receiving countries, other destinations such 
as the USA, the UK and Canada have become attractive to an increasing number of Albanian 
emigrants. If we highlight the profile of emigrants, we may find out a more tragic truth. 
According to Barjaba, between 1990 and 2003, approximately 45 per cent of Albanian 
                                                          
6
 However, based on Instat 2011 Census data , the total population of Albania is 2,831,741. The population of 
Albania has decreased by 7.7% in about ten years (Instat 2011: 14). Large scale emigration and fertility decline 
are supposed to be the main causes of the observed population decrease.  
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university professors and researchers emigrated, and more than 65 per cent of scholars who 
received graduate degrees in the West during 1980-1990 chose to remain there (Barjarba 
2004: 233). After visa liberalisation in 2011, the predictions point out that the brain-drain 
will have an incline trend in the future. The lack of Albanian legislation in this area causes 
the emigration of its intellectual future. Many well-educated Albanian migrants prefer to 
establish their lives in host countries in the EU. This fact significantly explains the decline of 
the total population and demographic change in Albania. Meanwhile, Albanian migration 
matures and processes of family reunion and settlement take place in host societies (King 
and Vullnetari 2003: 51). This leads to a reorientation of migrants’ savings and investments 
towards the host society, and a consequent falling-off of remittances. 
Many scholars argued the mass Albanian emigration flows period, i.e. the post-1990 era 
(King and Vullnetari 2003; King 2005; Vullnetari 2007; Aliu 2011a). Historically, the mass 
Albanian emigration flows begin with Embassy crisis. During the summer of 1990 up to 5 
thousand Albanians sought refuge in Western embassies in Tirana. Between the embassy 
invasion and February 1991, an estimated 20 thousand Albanian migrants had left the state. 
With the chaos triggered boat exoduses to Italy, during 1991-1992, an estimated 200 
thousand Albanians left the country. In 1997, the crisis of the pyramid system which also 
happened in other Soviet bloc countries, occurred in Albania and the country descended 
into civil war conflict. Internal rebellion which began first in Albania spread to Kosovo as a 
domino effect (Aliu 2011a). Pyramid schemes' collapse triggered a period of utter economic 
and political chaos, and brought down the government. In 1998 the long-awaited 
regularisation of irregular immigrants in Greece took place; two-third of those regularised 
were Albanians. Albanians were also prominent in the regularisations in Italy in 1998. In 
1998, economic recovery after the pyramid fiasco was remarkably rapid (GDP grew by 12 
per cent in 1998), but a still-fragile Albania was destabilised by the Kosovar refugee crisis in 
1999; 500 thousand ethnic-Albanian Kosovar refugees entered northern Albania, putting 
enormous pressure on the country's poorest region. During 2000-2010 according to the 
World Bank data, Albanian net migration7 (total migration) numbers are as such: -270245 
                                                          
7
 The sum of the entries or arrivals of immigrants, and of exits, or departures of emigrants, yields the total 
volume of migration, and is termed total migration, as distinct from net migration, or the migration balance, 
resulting from the difference between arrivals and departures. This balance is called net immigration when 
arrivals exceed departures, and net emigration when departures exceed arrivals (IOM 2004: 65). 
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(2000), -72243 (2005) and -47889 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of 
asylum has decreased from 523 refugees in 2000 to 76 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee 
population by country of territory of origin has increased from 6802 refugees in 2000 to 
14772 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 76695 
(2000) 2.5 per cent of population, 82668 (2005) 2.6 per cent of population and 89106 (2010) 
2.8 per cent of population (see Table A2). Some scholars implied that future trends may 
change statistical illustrations. For example, there is high return potential among long-term 
migrants from Greece and Italy (due to sovereign debt crisis) which is expected to take place 
over the coming 5-10 years. However, large-scale family-based return migration seems 
unlikely. Albanian community networks have enhanced and encouraged business 
opportunities and strengthened Albania’s comparative and competitive advantages for 
inclusion of return migrants (Geniş and Maynard 2009; Kahanec and Zimmermann 2010). 
Another Western Balkan state is FYR Macedonia. Migration from the Republic of Macedonia 
to foreign countries is basically determined by the changes in socio-economic development 
and political stability in the country. Changes regarding the restrictions and selectiveness of 
migration policies in the receiving countries also influence the migration process (Nikolovska 
2004: 319). The numbers of migrants are high while the Macedonian Agency for Emigration 
estimates that there are about 350 thousand Macedonian citizens living abroad, according 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this number amounts to 800 thousand (Center for 
Research and Policy Making 2007: 44). According to World Bank Macedonia bilateral 
estimates of migrant stock data 2010, total number of migrants in host countries is 447 
thousand (21.9 per cent of population). However, the exact number of emigrants, and 
immigrants is unknown as there were 5613 claims for asylum by Macedonians in 2001 and 
5549 in 2002, with a low 2 per cent recognition rate and a 7 per cent total rate of 
protection, which likely accounts for a certain number of returning migrants. Although no 
information is available about the ethnicity of the asylum-seekers, the circumstantial 
evidence indicates that many are members of either the Albanian or of the Roma minority 
(Center for Research and Policy Making 2007: 25). During 2000-2010 according to the World 
Bank data, Macedonian net migration numbers are as such: -9000 (2000), -4000 (2005) and 
2000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 9050 
refugees in 2000 to 1398 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of 
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territory of origin has increased from 2176 refugees in 2000 to 7889 refugees in 2010. There 
is also an incline at the international migration stock: 125665 (2000) 6.3 per cent of 
population, and 129701 (2010) 6.3 per cent of population (see Table A2). In addition, the 
2002 population census indicated 86 thousand immigrants, or 4.3 per cent of the total 
population, slightly below the 93 thousand (4.8 per cent) of the previous census of 1994. 
Among the immigrants counted in the 2002 census, 63 per cent were from Serbia and 
Montenegro and around 10 per cent from Greece. 1900 migrants had a residence permit, 
the majority from Serbia and Montenegro (Kupiszewski 2009: 22). According to the updated 
list of registered voters presented at the beginning of May 2007 by the Ministry of Justice 
there are 59650 voters staying abroad up to one year out of 1742316 registered voters in 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (International Organisation for Migration 
2007c: 15). The population census of 2002 identified 22995 people being abroad for a 
period of up to one year and another 12128 staying longer. Recent research reveals that 
56.3 per cent of Macedonian migrants have been staying in their host countries for two to 
five years. Women are more likely to stay less than 2 years while men are believed to spend 
longer periods in the destination country. Top five EU states that Macedonian migrants 
prefer are Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and France. 
The situation in Kosovo8 which is another Western Balkan state, so-called the new born (the 
4-year-old) state, is more tragic. Migration has certainly been an outcome of the state’s 
economic backwardness. Kosovar men migrate as the only hope to provide prosperity for 
their families and to escape poverty (Vathi and Black 2007: 18). Displacements in and from 
Kosovo did not begin with the NATO bombing on 24 March 1999. The scale of displacement 
and exodus became enormous after that date, but the fact that displacements were already 
taking place, and the genocide of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo by Serbian military and police 
were being reported and observed by international press and Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) monitors, was one of the most outspoken reasons given for 
embarking on the NATO intervention. Between 1995 and 1997 at least 114430 asylum 
applications had been lodged in EU member states by people coming from the Federal 
                                                          
8
 Surface of Kosovo (SoK) is 10908.1 km². According to the SoK assessment, the number of habitual residents is 
2.1 milion inhabitants with the ethnic composition: Albanians 92 per cent; Other ethnic groups comprise of 8 
per cent of the total number of population (Republika e Kosovës Ministria e Administratës Publike Enti i 
Statistikës së Kosovës 2011). 
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Republic of Yugoslavia (Selm 2000: 4). Kosovo’s proximity to the EU created strong political 
support for the military intervention and huge humanitarian and development assistance. In 
addition, the UN Peace Accord (Resolution 1244) did not resolve the more fundamental 
issue of Kosovo’s status and since the creation of the provisional government by the UN 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) there has been a confused set of governance arrangements. 
Kosovo faced the transition of UN administration to EULEX and a national government, 
supervised by a postindependence International Civilian Representative. Kosovo’s Feburary 
2008 declaration of independence recognised by 90 countries and that contested by Serbia, 
China and Russia (Chapman et al. 2008: 6). 
European policy makers expect Kosovo to experience ‘zero migration’. However, there is a 
high dependence of Kosovo’s economy on remittances. Around 30 per cent of Kosovo’s 
families have one or more family member(s) that lives abroad. Approximately 39 per cent of 
emigrants live in Germany, 23 per cent in Switzerland, in Italy 6 per cent, in Austria 7 per 
cent, in Great Britain 4 per cent, in Sweden 5 per cent, in the USA 3.5 per cent and France, 
Canada and Croatia 2 per cent in each (Ministry of Internal Affairs 2009: 8). According to 
World Bank migration data total number of bilateral migrant stocks for host country is; 
25251, and top destination EU countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK. There was 
also a relatively large inflow of Kosovar return migrants in the late 1990s in response to the 
political stabilisation following the NATO intervention and the withdrawal of their 
temporary protection status by Germany9. Moreover, recent events on normalisation of 
political situation and harmonisation and Europeanisation of Kosovo’s institutions have 
created stable ambiance for Kosovar return migrants. Furthermore, Kosovo and Serbia has 
started a normalisation process10, a process of dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade, a 
dialogue also known as talks on talks in order to strengthen their relationship with each 
other. Although it’s known that there are stark differences on the existence of an 
                                                          

 Quoted from;  2 May 2012; http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/  
9
 The European Stability Initiative estimated that 174 thousand Kosovars left Germany at that time, the largest 
return movement from any EU country. 
10
 The conditions to explicitly encourage the European integration of one another will be created within this 
process, although the differences in opinion on the status will remain. This means the creation of a measurable 
process that would allow all the EU member states to consider Kosovo as a contractual partner, including 
those that have not recognised Kosovo’s independence. Therefore, this measurable progress will qualify Serbia 
as a state which is creating the basis for resolving its neighborhood problems which is an important objective 
for the states having recognised Kosovo’s independence and that will have to decide on Serbia’s accession 
path. 
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independent Kosovo, the political authorities of both countries should define open topics 
that can be treated between the two countries without taking Kosovo’s status into 
consideration. It is obvious that the success in the Balkans has been achieved only when an 
intensive true cooperation between the EU and the USA has existed. The diplomatic visits of 
EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine M. Ashton and US Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton to 
Western Balkan countries brought important contributions for stability of the region (Aliu 
2011a). The normalisation of the Kosovo-Serbia relations through the reappearance of this 
collaboration as part of a transatlantic regional integration policy will cause to an 
implementation of a transitory process of nonstatutory normalisation between Serbia and 
Kosovo (Surroi 2009: 20). Recently, Serbia and Kosovo have signed a crucial agreement 
which Serbia recognises technically Kosovo’s sovereignty and gives to Kosovo the 
representation right as an independent state under the condition that Kosovo must use 
footnote which indicates the UNSCR 1244 resolution and ICJ advisory decision. 
In addition, Kosovo continues to benefit from the Instrument for Preaccession Assistance 
(IPA), macrofinancial assistance, the Instrument for Stability and other sources of funding. 
Kosovo participates in the IPA multibeneficiary programmes including in an IPA crisis 
response package developed in 2008. The package is fully operational in 2010. A total of 
€508 million of EU assistance has been committed to Kosovo for the period 2008–2011. 
During 2010, a total of €67.3 million granted in the IPA annual programme for 2010 was 
allocated in close coordination with the Ministry for European Integration and government 
institutions (European Commission 2010c: 6). 
Montenegro, another Western Balkan state with the lowest population11, has better 
migration dynamics comparing to its neighbours. Montenegro has been accepted as the EU 
candidate state recently, and its European perspective was reaffirmed by the Council in June 
2006 after the recognition of the country's independence from Serbia and EU member 
states. Montenegro submitted an application for EU membership on 15 December 2008. In 
line with Article 49 of the EU Treaty, the member states requested, on 23 April 2009, that 
the European Commission prepare an opinion upon the merits of the application 
(Delegation of the European Union 2011b). As of 19 December 2009 EU visa were altered, 
                                                          
11
 Estimated population of the Republic of Montenegro (2007) is 625,000 inhabitants; Urban 62 per cent 
(2003), in 2006 population growth (annual, per cent) was 0.16, life expectancy at birth in 2007 was average 
72.7; Male 70.6 and Female 74.8 (UNDP 2009: 7). 
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allowing Montenegro’s citizens (along neighbours from Serbia and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, in 2011 with Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania) visa-free access 
to all 25 Schengen member states within the Union, as well as two states outside the 
European Union; the UK and Ireland. This was a result of a process that was launched in May 
2008. Granting of visa-free travel required the fulfilment of key benchmarks in the areas of 
rule of law, travel documents and border security. 
Immigrants to Montenegro mostly originate from other countries within the Western Balkan 
region. According to the Employment Agency of Montenegro, the majority of labour 
migrants originate from Serbia (56 per cent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (27 per cent), Kosovo 
(11 per cent), the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (3 per cent) and another 3 per 
cent is unknown (International Organisation for Migration 2007a: 14). During 2000-2010 
according to the World Bank data, Montenegro net migration numbers are as such: -32450 
(2000), -20632 (2005) and -2508 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of 
asylum has decreased from 24019 refugees in 2009 to 16364 refugees in 2010, whereas 
refugee population by country of territory of origin as increased from 2582 refugees in 
2009 to 3246 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 
54583 (2005) 8.7 per cent of population, and 42509 (2010) 6.7 per cent of population (see 
Table A2). 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the most complicated political and judicial system (i.e. three 
independent administrative and legislative areas – Federation, Republica Srpska and Brčko 
according to the Dayton Accords which was signed in 1995) in Western Balkans, shares 
almost the same situation with Kosovo. The population of BiH dwindled from 4.4 million 
inhabitants in 1989 to 3.8 million in 2004. The loss of more than 650 thousand individuals 
amounted to a decrease of 14.7 per cent of the population only in 5 years. In 1995, Serbian 
Army made genocide in Srebrenica in Bosnia and this criminal act caused a loss of tens of 
thousands of Bosnian people. 
Figures released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2007 show that 1343805 citizens 
of BiH are currently living abroad, whereas the World Bank Remittance Migration and 
Remittances Factbook for BiH refers to a figure as high as 1471594. It is estimated that more 
than 800 thousand are living in other parts of Europe (such as, Germany, Sweden, Norway, 
Italy, Austria, Croatia, Serbia, Switzerland) and nearly half a million in the USA and Canada 
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(International Organisation for Migration 2007d: 15). The top destination EU countries are 
Croatia (EU member in 2013), Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and France. The 2003 
European Commission Annual Report on Asylum and Migration highlights 1042 BiH citizens 
apprehended in Sweden in 2003 and 387 in Slovenia, for the same year. There were 866 BiH 
citizens refused entry on the Czech Republic, 254 in Bulgaria, 819 in Hungary, and a 5226 in 
Slovenia. In terms of removed BiH citizens, 295 from Denmark, 123 from Finland, 1352 from 
Sweden, 704 from Norway, and 271 from Slovenia. In 2004, 2144 BiH nationals were sent 
back to their country, primarily from Sweden (28 per cent) and Germany (22 per cent). In 
2005, 1533 citizens of BiH were deported on various grounds to BiH from countries in 
Western Europe and other countries (International Organisation for Migration 2007d: 21). 
During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Bosnia and Herzegovina net migration 
numbers are as such: 281795 (2000), 61825 (2005) and -10000 (2010). Refugee population 
by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 38152 refugees in 2000 to 7016 
refugees in 2010, and refugee population by country of territory of origin has decreased 
from 474981 refugees in 2000 to 63004 refugees in 2010 as well. There is also a decline at 
the international migration stock: 96001 (2000) 2.6 per cent of population, 35141 (2005) 0.9 
per cent of population, and 27780 (2010) 0.7 per cent of population (see Table A2). 
Eventually, the main challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina are divergence of administrative 
institutions on migration policy and regulations, weakness of migration control and 
management, lack of coordination and migration databases and an uncertain migration 
agenda. 
Another more complex case is the Republic of Serbia. It must be highlighted that several 
limitations exist that hinder the conduct of a comprehensive analysis of the current situation 
concerning migration trends in Serbia. First of all, there are many data sets and sources 
about Serbia but some of them include both Montenegro and Kosovo, the others include 
either Montenegro or Kosovo. In this case, the confusion occurs at analysing specifically the 
Serbian migrants and refugees with the exclusion of Montenegrin and Kosovar migrants and 
refugees. Based on estimates, between 3.2 and 3.8 million Serbs or persons of Serbian origin 
live outside Serbia’s borders. However, estimates of Serbian emigrants by the Ministry of 
Diaspora range is from 3.9 million to 4.2 million (Siar 2008: 23). According to Siar (2008), in 
2005, the total number of immigrants is 512336 (4.9 per cent of total population), in 2007, 
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total number of refugees is 97417 and in the same year total number of Asylum seekers is 
64, and the number of labour migrant is 6324 (excluding Kosovo/UNSC 1244). Furthermore, 
in 2005, total number of emigrants is; 2298352. Main EU countries of destination are 
Germany, Austria, Croatia (EU member in 2013), Sweden and Italy. During 2000-2010 
according to the World Bank data, Serbia net migration numbers are as such: -147889 
(2000), -338544 (2005) and 0 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum 
has decreased from 484391 refugees in 2000 to 73608 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee 
population by country of territory of origin has increased from 146748 refugees in 2000 to 
183289 refugees in 2010. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 856763 
(2000) 11 per cent of population, 674612 (2005) 9 per cent of population, and 525388 
(2010) 7 per cent of population (see Table A2). 
Migration flows from Western Balkans to the EU have also economic consequences and 
dimensions. In Albania, there is an increase at both inward remittance flows and outward 
remittance flows. In 2003, the inward remittance flows is $889 million, and in 2009 the 
inward remittance flows reached $1.3 billion. In parallel, in 2003, the outward remittance 
flows is $4 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached $10 million. In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $1749 million, and in 2009 the 
inward remittance flows reached $2.2 billion. In addition, in 2003, the outward remittance 
flows is $20 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached $61 million. In 
Macedonia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $174 million, and in 2009 the inward 
remittance flows reached $401 million. In parallel, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is 
$16 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached $26 million. In Serbia, in 
2003, the inward remittance flows is $2.7 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows 
reached $5.4 billion. However, there is a decline at outward remittance flows from $138 
million in 2008 to $91 million in 2009. Another economic consequence of migration flows is 
workers’ remittances: in 2009, Albania received $1.1 billion worth of remittances per year, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina $1.4 billion, FYR Macedonia $260 million and Serbia $3.8 billion. 
Table A2 illustrates another aspect of immigration from Western Balkans to the EU. 
Feminisation of immigration policies is very crucial because the empirical results highlight 
the fact that a high percentage of immigrants stock in 2010 are females. In Albania, 53.1 per 
cent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 50.3 per cent, in Macedonia 58.3 per cent, in Montenegro 
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61.5 per cent and in Serbia 56.7 per cent of immigrants are females. Therefore, from gender 
perspective, at national level states must regulate specific immigration regulations for 
protection of female immigrants and ensure fair and antidiscriminative solutions. At 
supranational level, the European Commission should amend immigration regulations with a 
guarantee of full protection of female migrants’ rights. In addition, feminisation of migration 
is an important factor for demographic change in the EU and might be a perfect solution for 
ageing population of the EU. Feminisation of migration has also another significant effect on 
family reunifications and fits in the dialectics of triple win and hybrid model which will be 
argued in section four. 
The EU is very optimistic regarding the development and integration of Western Balkans. 
The European Commission progress reports and published documents of international 
institutions for these countries are stressing the importance of peace, stability and security 
in Western Balkans, and the EC welcomes all efforts of the Western Balkan countries to 
come closer to the EU (European Commission 2006; European Commission 2008; European 
Commission 2010a; European Commission 2010b; EUobserver 2010; Delegation of the 
European Union 2011a; Delegation of the European Union 2011b; European Commission 
2011i; European Commission 2011j). Nationalism, transitional justice, returnees, regions of 
concern, education, civil society and peacebuilders were identified as being the biggest 
obstacles to lasting peace and stability in the Western Balkan region (Shaw 2009). In this 
context, the EU will cooperate and assist the Western Balkan countries to overcome these 
challenges and adopt Europeanisation systematically. Kukan (2010) argued that the EU 
ought to; use lessons from the previous enlargements, have a clear vision of enlargement 
process, achieve political and popular consensus in both sides (i.e. the EU and the Western 
Balkans), achieve conditionality, tailored country strategies, regional cooperation and merit 
based approach for common European perspective, and consider the Western Balkans as a 
whole not focusing on the individual countries (Kukan 2010: 36-37). In the process of 
Stabilisation Association Process, Kukan’s recommendations are very significant for dealing 
with challenges in the region. 
According to the Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework for IPA for the years 2011-
2013: Albania will receive an indicative allocation of €228.82 million of preaccession funds 
including IPA Component II – Cross border cooperation. Bosnia and Herzegovina will receive 
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an indicative allocation of EUR 328.7 million of preaccession funds. The current Multiannual 
Indicative Financial Framework 2011-2013 allocates a further €212.4 million to Kosovo. 
Macedonia will receive an indicative allocation of €320.3 million of preaccession funds. 
Montenegro Montenegro will receive an indicative allocation of €104.9 million of 
preaccession funds. Serbia will receive an indicative allocation of €622.3 million of 
preaccession funds. For the planned allocation per sector and per year see Table A3. 
To sum up, the EU is shaping future objectives of the Western Balkan countries. For these 
countries, the enlargement and integration are processes which will bring European norms 
and standards, and make these countries reconstruct their European identities with looking 
to the future through common perspectives. To link the Western Balkans with North Africa, 
it can be put forward that the EU is using almost the same strategies and policies for North 
African countries as well. Within two decades the EU has succeeded to transform the 
Western Balkans. Moreover, the EU has achieved the targets for Western Balkans with 
positive outcomes. Thus, the EU has put the North African countries in the same category as 
neighbour and economic partner states. Therefore, with the help of the Western Balkan 
experience, the EU aims to strengthen the relations with North Africa. 
 
3.3. General Overview of the EU and North African Countries Relations 
The EU is a transnational actor and has actively intervened to the transformation process in 
North African countries in order to stabilise the region, guarantee the protection of human 
rights, encourage enhanced democracy and pluralism, strengthen the rule of law, social 
justice, moral values, European norms and standards. The EU supports these countries’ 
transition process from autocratic and repressive political regimes to democracy and 
welfare state degree. In this context, the EU has established a partnership for democracy 
and shared prosperity with North African countries. While the EU respects internal 
transformation processes, the Union will share technical assistance and financial supports to 
governments, the European Institutions in these countries, local and regional authorities, 
political parties, foundations, trade unions and civil society organisations for achieving 
common interests, high level democracy, stability, peaceful and prosperous North Africa 
(European Commission 2011h). The EU may ensure the same solutions which the EU dealt 
with the Western Balkan countries in the past. Therefore, it can be put forward that the EU 
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brings the same agenda for the North African countries with some minor transformations 
and this links the North African countries’ future objectives and national strategies with the 
case of Western Balkans in various dimensions. The Western Balkans ought to be seen as a 
step forward of the North Africa in the same way and in the same fate. 
The European Union created the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 for 
strengthening the prosperity, stability and security both with its neighbours and within the 
EU. With the ENP, the EU established a partnership for reforms with its neighbours. The 
partnership had been much more stronger in sectoral reform and economic integration 
rather than in promoting democratisation and good governance. 
Beside various countries, the ENP framework covers all five North African countries – i.e. 
Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. Actually, the ENP is a bilateral policy; however, 
the Arab Spring awakenings have caused the enrichment of the policy focusing on relations 
at regional and multilateral level. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) or 
Association Agreements (AAs) were created for implementation of the ENP. In this context, 
the EU signed Association Agreements with five North African countries and supported each 
National Indicative Programme (NIP) of these states (European Commission 2007d; 
European Commission 2007e; European Commission 2007f; European Commission 2007g; 
European Commission 2007h). 
The aim of Association Agreements and NIPs namely are as follows: establishing relations 
based on reciprocity and partnership, the respect for human rights and democratic 
principles, political dialogue, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, 
strengthening the rule of law, control and prevention of illegal immigration, cooperation in 
the areas of corruption, support social policy, promoting private investments and job 
creation activities, upgrading economic infrastructure, non-discrimination in respect of 
conditions of work, pay and dismissal and social security provision and so on. In this context, 
the national indicative programme (NIP) is the Commission’s operational response for the 
period 2007-2010 with an approximately €220 million indicative amount. In addition, with 
respect to NIPs, the decentralisation process in these countries has been encouraged via EU 
financial supports and development assistance. For instance, there is a very high 
decentralisation trend in various industries in Algeria. The Algerian government intends to 
continue privatising some of the 1200 public enterprises remaining, particularly in the 
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banking sector. According to Algeria Strategy Paper, the banking sector is still largely in 
public hands. Public banks hold more than 90 per cent of assets. Although the share of 
credit allocated to the private sector has recently risen to more than 60 per cent, access to 
credit is still difficult for businesses. 
The Algerian government will reduce state intervention in sectors where the private sector 
could take over much more effectively (i.e. land and credit markets; investment and the 
provision of business services; infrastructure; the production of goods and services that are 
neither strategic nor public goods). The EU financial assistance will also encourage and 
speed up the decentralisation process in Algeria. Political situation has stablility and is 
available for welcoming private actors and foreign direct investments. For Egypt, the EU has 
approved financial allocations for financial cooperation in the years 2011-2013 in the sixth 
meeting of the EU and Egypt Association Council. The amount allocated for the period 2011-
2013 is €449.29 million (European Commission 2010d). For Libya, the EU supports the 
National Indicative Programme 2011-2013 and the EU’s contribution to the Benghazi Action 
Plan (BAP) has amounted to €8.5 million, with a further commitment of €2 million to follow 
in 2010. In 2009, the Commission announced its intention to allocate €20 million for 
migration. Half of this amount was used as such: €2 million for the prevention of irregular 
migration at Libya’s southern borders; €3.5 million for the management of irregular 
migration pressures in Libya; €4.5 million for assisting the Libyan border guard and police 
and develop technical cooperation with the EU agency Frontex. For the period 2011-2013, it 
is proposed to allocate a total budget of €60 million to the National Indicative Programme 
for Libya (€30-36 million for improving the quality of human capital and €24-30 million for 
increasing the sustainability of economic and social development). For Morocco, the EU has 
approved financial allocations for National Indicative Programme and the amount allocated 
for the period 2011-2013 is €580.5 million. For Tunisia, the EU has approved financial 
allocations for National Indicative Programme and the amount allocated for the period 
2011-2013 is €240 million. Recently, for the period 2011 to 2013 the EU raised the amount 
indicatively earmarked for Tunisia from EUR 240 million to EUR 400 million (excluding 
humanitarian assistance), an increase of EUR 160 million – in excess of 60 per cent.  
Furthermore, in Article 2 of the Commission Implementation Decision of 26 September 2011 
– approving the special measure for Tunisia (2011) for the development support programme 
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for less-developed areas was stated that the financial contribution of the EU is set at €20 
million (European Commission 2011f). 
Moreover, the European Commission has adopted the Joint Communication of 25 May 2011 
‘A new response to a changing Neighbourhood which set the following priorities: 
democratic transformation and institution building, partnership with people with specific 
emphasis on support to civil society, sustainable and inclusive growth and economic 
development. In Article 2 of the Commission Implementation Decision of 26 September 
2011 was stated that ‘the provisional maximum contribution of the EU to the ‘Support for 
Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING)’ programme is set at €350 million’ 
(European Commission 2011d). Moreover, in Article 2 of the Commission Implementation 
Decision of 22 December 2011 on a programme (Strengthening democratic reform in the 
southern Neighbourhood) was stated that the maximum contribution of the EU to the 
programme is set at €4 million (European Commission 2011e) (For the comparison of EU-
supported projects see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: The EU-supported Projects 
 
Project Title Total Cost Project Approach Components 
Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility 
CRIS: 2011/023-078 
€22 million 
Direct Centralised 
Management 
-Strengthening non-state actors12 capacities 
and increase public accountability, 
-Strengthening non-state actors through 
support to regional and country projects, 
-Increasing involvement of non-state actors 
in selected EU-partner countries policy 
dialogues 
Support for Partnership, Reforms and 
Inclusive Growth (SPRING) 
€350 million 
Direct/Indirect 
Centralised, Joint 
Management, Partially 
Decentralised 
- Democratic transformation and institution 
building, and priority area, 
- Sustainable and inclusive growth and 
economic development 
Strengthening Democratic Reform in 
the Southern Neighbourhood 
€4 million 
Joint management 
with an international 
organisation – the 
Council of Europe 
-Enhancing the political and democratic 
reform processes, independence and 
efficiency of judiciary, 
-Promoting good governance and 
democratic values, 
-Strengthening and protecting human rights 
Source: Authors compilation of European Commission 2011k; European Commission 2011l; European 
Commission 2011m 
 
The EU supports decentralisation process in Western Balkans and North African countries, 
and in fact the EU-supported projects are accelerating this process. Ratha, De and 
Mohapatra (2011) compared financial ratings of Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s for 
developing countries. The ratings of these institutions are crucial in determining the volume 
                                                          
12
 Non-state actors definition provided in Article 14 of the ENPI Regulation. 
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and cost of capital flows to developing countries through international bond, loan, and 
equity markets. According to the research, in Western Balkans; Albania has predicted rating 
range from BB to BB+ (same with Brazil; Colombia and El Salvador), actual rating of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is B2 (May 2006, Moody’s) and predicted rating range differs from BB- to 
BB, actual ratings of Macedonia are BB+ (August 2005, S&P) and BB+ (December 2005, Fitch) 
and predicted rating range varies from BB to BBB-, actual ratings of Serbia and Montenegro 
are BB- (July 2005, S&P) and BB- (May 2005, Fitch), predicted rating range varies from B- to 
BB. The ratings for North Africa are very interestingly more positive than the ratings of 
Western Balkans. Despite the Arab Spring, it can be put forward that decentralisation 
process in North Africa has been supported by international financial rating institutions. For 
instance, for Algeria predicted rating range differs from A to AA (same with Chile; China and 
Estonia), Libya has the highest credit quality - predicted rating range differs from AA to AAA, 
for Egypt actual ratings are BB+ (May 2002, S&P), Ba1 (July 2001, Moody’s) and BB+ 
(December 2004, Fitch) and predicted rating range differs from BBB- to BBB, for Morocco 
actual ratings are BB+ (August 2005, S&P), Ba1 (July 1999, Moody’s) and predicted rating 
range differs from BBB- to BBB. It is assumed that decentralisation and foreign direct 
investment attraction are more likely in North Africa, whereas the Western Balkans have 
speculative rates which mean state’s authority in these countries exists. 
This point is a distinction of comparative states’ structure because North African countries’ 
migration history essentially is largely driven by a variety of reasons: notably, slave-trade 
and colonialism, violent conflicts, poverty, ecological degradation, population pressure and 
a certain cultural propensity of some ethnic groups for outward orientation (Kohnert 2007: 
5). The dramatic conflicts in North African countries have attracted the attention of all 
neighbour countries. Unknown future of these countries is concerning particularly the EU 
because the Arab Spring movements and demonstrations have caused a rapid incline of 
migrants who are from Libya, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. 
The framework of African migration as a whole has a great complexity. The number of 
international migrants in Africa in 2010 is estimated to be 19 million. Africa hosted just 
fewer than 9 per cent of the total global stock of migrants in 2010. Although there were 291 
million Africans living in urban areas in 2006, the OECD estimates that 1.2 billion people will 
be living in cities in Africa by 2050 (International Organisation for Migration 2010). In this 
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context, the Arab Spring has shifted circulation of migrants from North African cities to EU 
cosmopolitan cities. The results of the Arab Spring are very tragic and put a huge question 
mark for the future of North African countries (European Commission 2011a: 5). Through its 
humanitarian financing and the provision of means of transport, the EU has so far 
contributed to the repatriation of approximately 50 thousand third country nationals. 
The total migrant stock in North Africa decreased between 1990 and 2005. During the years 
2005–2010, it has reached 1.8 million migrants in 2010. Similarly, the stock of international 
migrants as a percentage of total population increased from 1.3 per cent in 2005 to 1.4 per 
cent in 2010. Thus, the EU needs to strengthen its external migration policies because there 
is a great need for partnerships with North African countries for addressing the issues 
related to migration and mobility in a way that makes cooperation mutually beneficial. In 
developing such a policy, migration issues should be integrated into the overall EU's external 
relations to promote EU's interest and needs. In the final conclusions in 2011, EU leaders 
expressed their solidarity for those member states and said that the bloc's border agency, 
Frontex, should increase its capacity through national governments financial support and 
extra money from the EU budget (Pop 2011). With centralising power to the EU institutions, 
setting up a control mechanism is indispensable and very crucial for measurement and 
effective management. In this context, many scholars and authors underlined the fact that a 
common migration and asylum policy can shape a better controlling migration approach 
(Sørensen 2006; Castillo Curry and Sylvester 2011; Mahony 2011; Pawlak 2011; European 
Commission 2011a). The European Union has consulted with the countries of the region 
concerned on financial and technical support to improve the control and management of 
borders and measures to facilitate the return of migrants to their countries of origin (Pop 
2011). However, managing and contolling migration have become a problematic in terms of 
the 1995 Schengen Agreement. The thousands of migrants arriving in Italy and Malta have 
highlighted the fragile trust-based nature of the Schengen Agreement that allows for 
passport-free travel in 25 European countries (Mahony 2011). Moreover, the 
announcement of Denmark regarding establishment of customs checks on its borders with 
Sweden and Germany because of rising crime concerns has put the Schengen Agreement’s 
regulations in the core of the debates. In particular, the Commission wants to ensure all EU 
governments adhere to the same standards when dealing with refugees from North African 
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countries. However, under current regulation, migrants should seek asylum in the country 
that was their first port of entry into the EU. On the one hand, some migrants take 
advantage of borderless travel in the EU to file asylum applications in other countries known 
for better asylum conditions. On the other hand, some of them are sent back to Italy or 
Greece for asylum application. Countries such as Greece and Italy argue others should 
shoulder more of the burden of immigration. Some states also would like to see more joint 
efforts in securing EU borders (Geddes 2005; European Commission 2011a). Furthermore, 
the EU policies on migration and development for North African countries face many 
challenges that are similar to the case of Western Balkan migration flows. For instance; in 
the EU there are institutional constraints inherent that have to be overcome. The EU can 
provide financial aid and special assistance in order to prevent occurring possible conflicts in 
the North African region. However, there are also national interests of the EU countries 
which partly reflect diverging national experiences of migration patterns. Therefore, EU 
policies and attitudes often reflect ad hoc solutions that are the result of compromise 
between the interests of various actors both within and outside the system. 
However, these solutions sometimes cause a transformation from legal migration to 
irregular migration and therefore for improvement of these issues, home countries, host 
countries and transit countries should amend legal regulations with including more specific 
statements and articles. 
Growing migration pressures in home countries led to massive flows of illegal migrants from 
many Western Balkan and North African countries. Some of these flows took on the form of 
movements of mala fide refugees, while some others took on the much more perverse form 
of human smuggling and trafficking (Bonifazi et al. 2008: 12). According to the Council of 
Europe anticipations there are over 5.5 million irregular migrants living in the European 
Union (Kourkoula 2008: 15). It is worth noting that those who enter illegally are few 
compared to those many more that arrive through regular channels, with a valid visa and 
then overstay. 
Eurostat (2011) stated that the EU countries are currently receiving large-scale migration. In 
2005, the EU had a migration flow around 1.8 million people. Therefore, the EU had to 
implement policies and take measure for these migration inflows from North African 
countries which reached very high numbers with unending conflicts of Arab Spring. The high 
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migration statistics indicate the fact that capacities of the EU member states are not at 
adequate level to overcome all migration issues. Therefore, illegal migration is becoming a 
threat for the EU in all aspects and dimensions. The North African routes13 must be 
observed scientifically in order to control regular migration and prevent irregular migration. 
 
3.4. Country Analyses: Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria 
The 1990s Western Balkans conflict era and 2000s postconflict era may highlight many 
aspects of how to deal with chaotic migration in North African countries. Although, the lack 
of reliable sources makes the research complicated, available sources present some 
similarities with Western Balkan case and therefore a comparison in this context bridges the 
practice to theory or model which will be discussed in chapter four. 
A bilateral agreement with Libya in May 2009 substantially reduced illegal migration across 
the Straits of Sicily. While 37 thousand migrants were intercepted along the Italian coast in 
2008, the number fell to 9.6 thousand in 2009 and to less than 3 thousand in 2010. The 
number of asylum seekers consequently fell from 31 thousand in 2008 to 17.6 thousand in 
2009. In the first half of 2010, asylum requests fell a further 35 per cent. Despite refugees in 
Libya not being officially recognised, according to CARIM, about 18.9 thousand refugees and 
asylum seekers were in Libya in 2009. Among them, 12322 were registered with UNHCR, 
9005 of whom were refugees and 3317 of whom were asylum seekers (CARIM 2010). In 
June 2010, following a seventh round of negotiations with the EU, Libya expelled the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with whom 9 thousand refugees and 4 
thousand asylum-seekers were registered (Bredeloup and Pliez 2011: 13). The number of 
migrants, landing in Lampedusa Island, decreased by 94 per cent between 2009 and the first 
six months of 2010. According to an estimate from the Italian government, between 200 
thousand and 300 thousand people are expected to land on European coasts in the near 
                                                          
13
 There are three broad routes: the first is from East Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea), through Sudan to 
Libya. Migrants from the Horn of Africa also cross over the Gulf of Aden to Yemen (Kourkoula 2008: 94). It is 
striking that Yemen in 2006 hosted 88000 refugees from these countries. The second route is the from West 
and Central Africa (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ghana, Cameroon) to Mali and 
Niger. The route then splits to Libya, or to Algeria and Morocco, or to Mauritania and Morocco. The third route 
links Morocco through Algeria to Libya and Tunisia, a horizontal corridor for migrants already ‘in transit’ in the 
region, who move eastwards or westwards according to rumours about where it is currently easier to cross or 
where jobs are available. 
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future, a figure based on the fact that 2.5 million foreign workers are currently living in 
Libya. Brussels argues for its part that the number of potential migrants lies somewhere 
between 500 thousand and 700 thousand people. During 2000-2010 according to the World 
Bank data, net migration numbers of Libya are as follows: -20300 (2000), -20300 (2005) and 
-20300 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 
11543 in 2000 to 7923 in 2010, whereas refugee population by country or territory of origin 
has slightly increased from 619 in 2000 to 2309 in 2010. There is also an incline at the 
international migration stock: 558770 (2000) approximately 11 per cent of population, 
617536 (2005) approximately 11 per cent of population and 682482 (2010) approximately 
11 per cent of population (see Table A4). According to World Bank Libya bilateral estimates 
of migrant stock data (2010) total number of migrants in host countries is 110080 and top 
destination EU countries are the UK, Germany and Italy. 
According to the Minister of Manpower and Migration, the number of Egyptian migrants 
reached almost 5 million individuals in 2010. The Egyptian government after the 25 January 
2011 revolution has encouraged the migration of Egyptians abroad, in order to lower 
unemployment, and to increase remittances (Sika 2011). During 2000-2010 according to the 
World Bank data, net migration numbers of Egypt are as follows: -945704 (2000), -370780 
(2005) and -346922 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has slightly 
increased from 6840 in 2000 to 95056 in 2010, and refugee population by country or 
territory of origin has increased from 3953 in 2000 to 6913 in 2010. There is also an incline 
between 2000-2005 and drop between 2005-2010 at the international migration stock: 
169149 (2000) approximately 0.25 per cent of population, 246745 (2005) approximately 0.3 
per cent of population and 244714 (2010) approximately 0.3 per cent of population (see 
Table A4). According to World Bank Egypt bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) 
total number of migrants in host countries is 3741055 and top destination EU country is 
Italy. 
During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of Algeria are 
as follows: -140000 (2000), -140000 (2005) and -140000 (2010). Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum has decreased from 169656 in 2000 to 94144 in 2010, and  
refugee population by country or territory of origin has decreased from 8034 in 2000 to 
6689 in 2010 as well. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 250110 
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(2000) approximately 0.8 per cent of population, 242446 (2005) approximately 0.7 per cent 
of population and 242324 (2010) approximately 0.7 per cent of population (see Table A4). 
According to World Bank Algeria bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total 
number of migrants in host countries is 1211118 and top destination EU countries are 
France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the UK. 
During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of Morroco are 
as follows: -500000 (2000), -614000 (2005) and -675000 (2010). Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum has decreased from 2105 in 2000 to 792 in 2010, whereas 
refugee population by country or territory of origin has slightly increased from 392 in 2000 
to 2284 in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 53124 (2000) 
approximately 0.2 per cent of population, 51020 (2005) approximately 0.2 per cent of 
population and 49098 (2010) approximately 0.15 per cent of population (see Table A4). 
According to World Bank Morocco bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total 
number of migrants in host countries is 3016631 and top destination EU countries are 
France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. 
During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, net migration numbers of Tunisia are 
as follows: -55624 (2000), -80599 (2005) and -20000 (2010). Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum has decreased from 436 in 2000 to 89 in 2010, whereas refugee 
population by country or territory of origin has increased from 1207 in 2000 to 2174 in 
2010. There is a decline at the international migration stock: 36221 (2000) approximately 
0.4 per cent of population, 34881 (2005) approximately 0.35 per cent of population and 
33591 (2010) approximately 0.3 per cent of population (see Table A4). According to World 
Bank Tunisia bilateral estimates of migrant stock data (2010) total number of migrants in 
host countries is 651737 and top destination EU countries are France, Italy, Germany and 
Belgium. 
Migration flows from North Africa to the EU have also economic consequences and 
dimensions. In Algeria, there is an increase at inward remittance flows. In 2003, the inward 
remittance flows is $1.75 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $2.06 
billion. In Egypt, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $2.96 billion, and in 2009 the 
inward remittance flows reached $7.15 billion. In parallel, in 2003, the outward remittance 
flows is $79 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached $255 million. In 
Wi
thd
raw
n b
y t
he
 au
tho
r
33 
 
Libya, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $8 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance 
flows reached $14 million. Whereas, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is $676 million, 
and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached $1 billion. Moreover, working 
remittances has increased from $644 million in 2003 to $964 million in 2008. In Morocco, in 
2003, the inward remittance flows is $3.6 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows 
reached $6.27 billion. In addition, there is an incline at outward remittance flows from $44 
million in 2003 to $61 million in 2009. In Tunisia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is 
$1.25 billion, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $1.96 billion. In addition, 
there is a decline at outward remittance flows from $17 million in 2003 to $13 million in 
2009. 
In terms of Feminisation of migration, the empirical results highlight the fact that a high 
percentage of immigrants stock in 2010 are females. In Algeria, 45.2 per cent, in Egypt 46.6 
per cent, in Libya 35.5 per cent and in Morocco 49.7 per cent, in Tunisia 49.3 per cent of 
immigrants are females. 
 
3.5. Data Comparison of Western Balkans and North African Countries 
The outcomes of data comparison of Western Balkans and North African countries are as 
follows: Libya has the highest international migration stock and thus the highest percentage 
of population in North Africa. Similarly, in Western Balkans, Serbia has the highest 
international migration stock and percentage of population. In North Africa, Egypt, Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia follow Libya with high level of migration stock. However, Tunisia and 
Algeria have higher percentage of population of international migration stock than Egypt. In 
paralel, in Western Balkans, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
follow Serbia with high level of migration stock. In addition, percentage of population of 
international migration stock of Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania are relatively high 
despite the fact that these countries have a low population rate comparing with Serbia (For 
numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4). 
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Figure 1: International Migration Stock Comparison of Western Balkans and North African 
Countries 
 
The results of the comparison of percentage of population of the stock of immigrants, 
females as percentage of immigrants and percentage of population of the stock of 
immigrants of Western Balkans and North African countries are as such: In North Africa,  
Libya has the highest percentage of population of the stock of immigrants. Morocco has the 
highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants and females as percentage of 
immigrants. In paralel, in Western Balkans, Montenegro has the highest percentage of 
population of the stock of immigrants and females as percentage of immigrants. 
Additionally, Albania has the highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants. 
(For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4). 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Population of the Stock of Immigrants, Emigrants and Females as 
Percentage of Immigrants 
 
According to the World Bank bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host 
countries, in North Africa, Libya has the highest number of migrant stock at home country 
and Egypt has the highest number of migrant stock at host country. In Western Balkans, 
Albania has the highest number of migrant stock at home country and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has the highest number of migrant stock at host country (For numerical 
comparisons see Table A2 and A4). 
Figure 3: Bilateral Estimates of Migration Stock at Home and Host Country 
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Comparing inward and outward remittance flows of the Western Balkans and North African 
countries, both two graphs illustrate dynamic trends. For instance, in North Africa, Egypt 
and Morroco have slightly increasing trend at inward remittance flows, and Libya has the 
highest amount of outward remitance flows. In paralel, in Western Balkans, Serbia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina have high level of inward and outward remittance flows (For 
numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4). 
 
Figure 4: Inward and Outward Remittance Flows Comparison of Western Balkan and North 
African Countries 
 
The World Bank data comparison of refugee population by country or territory of asylum of 
Western Balkans and North African countries indicates interesting results. In North Africa, 
Egypt and Algeria have the highest refugee population, whereas Tunisia has the lowest 
refugee population by country or territory of asylum. In Western Balkans, Montenegro and 
Serbia have the highest refugee population, whereas Albania has the lowest refugee 
population by country or territory of asylum (For numerical comparisons see Table A2 and 
A4). 
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Figure 5: Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Asylum 
 
In addition, the World Bank data comparison of refugee population by country or territory 
of origin of Western Balkans and North African countries emphasizes the fact that the 
Western Balkan region has a very high level of refugee population by country or territory of 
origin. Particularly, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania have the highest refugee 
population level. Whereas Montenegro has the lowest refugee population by country or 
territory of origin. In North Africa, Algeria and Egypt have the highest refugee population 
level, whereas Libya has the lowest refugee population by country or territory of origin (For 
numerical comparisons see Table A2 and A4). 
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Figure 6: Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin 
 
With respect to the illustrations above, researchers may recognize many similarities among 
Western Balkans and North African countries when they especially focus on concepts such 
as inward and outward remittance flows, of refugee population by country or territory of 
asylum, bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host countries and so forth. 
The crucial point for generating a theoretical model in migration research is the 
generalisation of concepts as categories. This may provide significant correlations among 
similarities and differences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Albania
Algeria
BosniaHerzegovina
Egypt
Libya
M acedonia
M ontenegro
M orocco
Serbia
T unisia
country
Bars show M odes
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
year
135
557
1207
1291
1455
1575
2084
2202
2286
2507
2563
2920
3533
4678
5376
6291
6780
6913
7613
7926
8072
8353
9060
10615
11667
12197
14772
15711
74366
144231
174027
189989
228815
300006
447321
R
e
fu
g
e
e
 P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
Refugee Population by Country or Territory of Origin
Compar ison o f Western Balkans and Nor th  Afr ican Countries
Wi
thd
raw
n b
y t
he
 au
tho
r
39 
 
3.6. Linking Comparative Analyses with Controlling Migration and Hybrid Model 
Grounded theory covers the nexuses among the concepts and/or categories, the data and 
the theory. The categories ought to be grounded in the data in order to shape theory or 
model. In this context, the study has presented the cases of Western Balkans and North 
African countries data to form conceptual categories. The interrelationship among concepts 
and categories was illustrated as below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Interrelationship Among Concepts and Categories of Comparison Analyses 
Source: Author’s contribution. 
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The first step of controlling migration approach is visa applications. Many embassies of EU 
member states in Western Balkans and North African countries have set up new regulations 
and procedures so that migrants or potential migrants in these regions cannot obtain a valid 
visa because of not meeting the eligibility criteria. The evaluation process of visa 
applications reflects the attitude of EU member states towards migrants and gives a clue 
regarding the degree of the usage of rigid and restrictive visa regulations and procedures. If 
migrants success to obtain a valid visa, then the second step is about the remittances. Even 
though the migrants declare how they will finance themselves in host countries during visa 
application process, many inconvenient matters may occur while they are in host countries 
or different problems may emerge in home countries. Thus inward and outward remittances 
are the most dynamic factors which directly influence both migrants at host countries and 
their families at home countries or vice versa. The transfer of money amounts points out 
another issue which is obligatory partnership with private banks and institutions. Even 
public institutions at home countries may need to work with private institutions at host 
countries due several reasons. One of these reasons is the protection of migrants who are 
living in between home and host countries. For instance, migrants who face financial 
problems are problems of both sides, i.e. home country and host country. Therefore, 
hybridity which will be argued in the fourth section proposes a solution which links home 
and host country with public and private actors, and migrants with civil society. 
The third step is asylum that covers unqualified and low-skilled migrants. Generally, asylum 
seekers from Western Balkans and North African countries temporarily find solutions for 
working and staying at host countries. The pushing factors at their home countries and the 
high level of competitiveness and restrictive migration and asylum policies at host countries 
are the essential points which force asylum applicants finding alternative solutions. 
However, these solutions sometimes turn out as illegal forms and damage the image of 
home country and make the host country change the positive attitude toward asylum 
seekers. In fact, the main reason of negative behaviors of asylum seekers is the lack of 
information sources. In this context, hybrid model will ensure various knowledge base 
online platforms for asylum seekers so that they will enhance awareness of opportunities 
and advantages both at home and host countries. 
Wi
thd
raw
n b
y t
he
 au
tho
r
41 
 
The fourth step is more related to international migration because migration as a category 
frames the influxes and dynamics from a broader perspective. With this respect, hybrid 
model will provide strategies, policies and more effective solutions for measurement of 
migration dynamics and creation of collaborations among state, private and civil society in 
terms of pursuing triple win solutions (home, host countries and migrants) via 
decentralisation within public sphere and state’s authority to achieve the ultimate goal, i.e. 
the transition to the controlling migration approach. This will be a reflection of global trends 
because on the one side, in the EU, there is a demand for legal migration of high skilled 
workers and well-educated students and on the other side there is an ideal type which is 
shaped by migrants of Western Balkans and North African countries and symbolizes 
successes (i.e. achieving unimaginable). Moreover this combination will strengthen the 
partnership level among home and host countries and will provide some definite solutions 
for issues such as pensions, bargaining, social dialogue, social protection and inclusion, 
healthcare, job creations, capacity building and so on. 
 
4 Controlling Migration and Hybrid Model 
The research paper has initially presented empirical evidences of Western Balkans and 
North African countries’ migration flows to the EU. Basically, giving a general overview of 
these countries migration data helps us to construct controlling migration and hybrid model 
on the ground of these data. Of course, data must be clarified with all aspects, dimesions 
and details. However, the main purpose of this paper is to open a debate regarding the 
usage of hybrid model n migration research. 
If scientists consider research as an archaeological excavation, they might recognise the fact 
that there is a huge difference among the starting point of the research and finalising 
process of the research because nobody knows what the research outcomes will bring and 
in which theoretical angle will they fit in and/or which missing knowledge will they fill in. 
Therefore, first of all, some misusages and misunderstandings concerning with controlling 
migration and hybrid model need corrections. It is better to distinguish hybrid model as 
general/real hybrid model and specific/ideal hybrid model. General/real hybrid model 
covers state and non-state actors (see Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: General/Real Hybrid Model 
Source: Author’s contribution. 
 
From general/real hybrid model perspective, arguments of the researches which present a 
hybrid model without including three parts can be falsified. In this context, researchers are 
likely to make another mistake, i.e. categorising Figure 8 as a specific/ideal hybrid model. 
However, to achieve a specific/ideal hybrid model researchers ought to include other non-
state actors to this framework (see Figure 9). Probably, a total convergence among all state 
and non-state actors is an utopia. However, a specific/ideal hybrid model should cover state 
actors (e.g. government, municipality and so on) and non-state actors (e.g. civil society, 
private, cooperatives, trade unions, works councils, NGOs, lobby groups, diasporas, 
universities, churches and religious associations and communities, epistemic communities, 
the media and so forth). 
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Figure 9: Specific/Ideal Hybrid Model 
Source: Author’s contribution. 
 
In this context, ‘the Hybrid Model’ means state actors (government, municipality and so on) 
and non-state actors (private actors, civil society organisations, NGOs, Lobby Groups and so 
on) equally participating in various industries. The cooperation of public – private – civil 
society parts has an effective role at creating strategies, determining plans and forecasting 
models (Aliu 2011b: 1331). With ‘Hybrid Model’, states are embedded with non-state actors 
in actor constellations in equal order, and at least of the plurality of opinion development 
processes.  
Hybridity lies behind the understanding of third way approach. ‘The Third Way’ was argued 
by many remarkable scientists, politicians and authors (Lawrence 1988; Giddens 1998; Blair 
1998; Giddens 2000; Etzioni 2000; and Jordan 2010). The third way has various meanings 
such as ‘new progressivism’ for the American Democrats, ‘new labour’ for the Labour Party 
in Britain, a mainstream left or central left, a left-right rationalisation, political 
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environmentalism for Al Gore, the modernising left or modernising social democracy as 
Giddens-Blair concept, the structural pluralism in terms of the theory of structuration of 
Giddens. What differs the hybrid model from the third way idea is that the hybrid model 
seeks for approaching governance equilibrium in terms of the interest of state, economy 
and civil society from a broader perspective. Whereas, the third way idea looks more into 
political doctrines to create better political rhetoric for political actors of center left. Thus, 
the third way approach has a disequilibrium between theory and practice. It explains how 
the ideal policies ought to be, however, in practice it is vague that to which issues it 
provides solutions in real terms. Giddens created a triange which can be accepted in the 
context of general/real hybrid model, i.e. finance, manufacture and knowledge (Giddens 
2000: 72). He stated that: 
Knowledge is much less subservient to manufacture, since it becomes more and more the key 
to productivity. Financial markets grow increasingly diverse, driven as they are by the 
increasing complexity of available market knowledge. Government needs to build a 
knowledge base that will release the full potential of the information economy (Giddens 2000: 
72-3). 
On the other hand, Jordan raised his critics of the third way through looking to international 
financial crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and he considered the third way as failure 
because of being unsuccessful at regulating morality in economic and social relations 
(Jordan 2010). 
Habermas involved to hybridity debate however he strongly stressed the partnership with 
the leadership and central authority of state. 
The fundamental righ s had to become effective for offering as positive guarantees for participation 
with equal opportunity in the process of the production of social wealth, as well as that of the 
formation of public opinion. In the interplay of a commercial society the granting of equal opportunity 
in participating in social rewards (by way of the market) and in participating in the political institutions 
(as part of the general public) was to be attained only indirectly by means of guaranteeing freedom and 
security vis-à-vis the power concentrated in the state. A triple function of the fundamental rights is also 
legitimised by the fact that in an industrially advanced society private autonomy can be maintained and 
assured only as the derivative of a total political organisation (Habermas 1988: 115-7). 
However, Habermas preferred to construct the relations between state and civil society 
from Marxist point of view, rather investigating more specifically the ideal hybrid model. 
Nevertheless, remarkable scientists like Habermas put forward argumentations that take 
into account the world’s multidimensional transformation process. With respect to this 
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great transformation14, multilateralism, regionalisation and multipolarity caused emerging 
of new regional powers in the world. Monopol powers are by inches oligopolised and this 
situation has balanced global powers because of the rising competitiveness level at both 
international and transnational level, and therefore the hybrids in various countries are 
proliferating. Moreover, the economic power shift from the western countries to BRICs 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and East Asia and Pacific countries has 
prepared a base for the rise of Hybrid Model. The rise of middle classes and Small-Medium-
size Enterprises (SMEs) in these countries is a good evidence for effective hybridisation via 
national private actors in modern nation states (Aliu 2012). Hybridity has various 
dimensions; such as political hybridity (e.g. hybridity in governance model), economic 
hybridity (e.g. hybridity in political economy), cultural hybridity (e.g. hybrid identities15), 
judicial hybridity (e.g. hybridity in legal systems), environmental and social hybridity (e.g. 
ISO 14000 and ISO 26000) and so forth. 
According to the mode of institutionalisation, there are three types of governance; 
‘governance by governments’, ‘governance with governments’ and ‘governance without 
governments’. 
Table 2: Governance by/with/without government(s) 
 
Type of Governance Mode of Institutionalisation Norm Building Norm Implementing 
Governance by 
government(s) 
International/governmental 
cooperation 
Without self-organisation 
Via nation-states 
Governance with 
government(s) 
Global policy networks With self-organisation With nation-states 
Governance without 
government(s) 
Transnational network 
organisations 
Via self-organisation Without nation-states 
Source: Mückenberger 2008: 27 
Table 2 illustrates the types of governance with comparing modes of institutionalisation and 
how are built and implemented norms. At the level of governance by governments, states 
are presented by their own governments. The governments of states can create 
                                                          
14
 I refer to the terminology of Karl Polanyi. In his book – the Great Transformation – which was a magnum 
opus, he argued how capitalism was disembedded. 
15
 Migrants in host communities find themselves challenged because of the continuity and boundaries of the 
past. The process of belonging involves imagined communities and communities of practice for migrants and 
host communities. Therefore, this situation shapes migrants with hybrid identities between home and host 
countries (Babacan and Singh 2010). Papastergiadis entered to the hybrid identity debate with linking identity , 
culture and community with deterritorialisation, globalisation and hybridity (Blunt and Mary 2001; 
Hatziprokopiou 2002). From his analyses, it can be put forward that Western Balkans and North African 
countries’ citizens have hybrid identities. 
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MODEL 
Wi
thd
raw
n b
y t
he
 au
tho
r
46 
 
international global relations with other sovereign states or international organisations. This 
type of governance doesn’t let non-state actors to build norms and it exists only on nation-
state level. Classical nation-state model exists and norms are built without self-organisation. 
Governance with governments means among others also governments take place, however 
there are also non-state actors. Equal participation of state actors and non-state actors 
creates hybrid structures which come together to deal with common issues and gain 
common objectives. Hybrid model is typically related to governance with governments 
because public actors, private actors and civil society actors share common interests and 
these interests are quite important in terms of reciprocal understanding. For state actors 
hybrid model means centralised authority of state that has an influence on private sector 
and civil society. For private actors hybrid model means creation of new markets and 
capacity building. For civil society hybrid model means having a mainstream role among 
state and private and transform interests in favour of the goodness of society. 
With hybrid model, states are embedded with non-state actors in actor constellations in 
which they do not act on the basis of sovereignty, but of equal order, and at least of the 
plurality of opinion development processes. This is the reason why many cases of hybrid 
development situated among that which is categorised as sovereign within the state and 
that which is categorised as pertaining to private law (Mückenberger 2008: 28). Therefore, 
distinguishing these cases is very complicated because these can become an amalgam which 
is not only a part of private law but also it is a part of public law. Hence, the question which 
should be raised is how can be explained voice – entitlement nexus on the one hand, and 
legitimacy – effectiveness on the other in the context of hybrid complex structures? This 
question poses the legitimacy issue among state and non-state actors and the increasing 
legitimacy power of transnational non-state actors within the nation-state’ sovereignty. In 
addition, Hudson discussed this challenge that non-state actors or sovereignty-free actors 
influence deeply the inter-state system’s monopoly of authority. ‘Some commentators 
assessed a power shift from state to non-state actors, as sovereignty-free actors link up and 
operate across state borders as part of transnational networks’ (Hudson 2001: 334). We can 
assume that the current transformation of governance for political concepts such as central 
authority, sovereignty, decentralisation and democratic legitimacy is to balance the 
tendency towards theoretical complexity with the need for simplicity to avoid replicating 
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the multidimensional and multicausal nature of current world politics (Dingwerth and 
Pattberg 2006: 200). 
In the light of these considerations, hybrid model in migration is a transition for social 
transformation and decentralisation. For instance, migration and asylum issues acquire 
elements of multi-level governance and a theoretical dispersal of power away from the 
nation-state with the assigning policy-making capacity to Brussels (Dijstelbloem and Meijer 
2011: 35). On the one hand, this gives to Brussels a central authority, on the other hand, this 
shift of power causes decentralisation in nation state structure. Central power of Brussels’ 
governance ought to be effectively enhanced by legally binding verdicts to take illegal 
migrants and asylum seekers under the control of the EU institutions. 
The European Commission has created at implementing decision on a special measure – 
neighbourhood civil society facility 2011, a new perspective that is a changing 
Neighbourhood – which supports a greater role for non-state actors through a partnership 
with societies, helping non-state actors develop their advocacy capacity, the ability to 
monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. The 
Communication proposes the establishment of a ‘Civil Society Facility’ to provide funding for 
non-state actors. The Civil Society Facility is also referenced in ‘Communication on A 
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean’, 
outlining the EU’s response to recent events in North Africa. The objective of the Facility is 
to strengthen and promote the role of non-state actors in reforms and democratic 
transformations through increased participation in the fulfilment of Neighbourhood Policy 
objectives (European Commission 2011c: 1).  In addition, civil society has a crucial role in 
advancing women’s rights, greater social justice and respect for minorities as well as 
environmental protection and resource efficiency. The EU Delegetions aim to bring partner 
countries’ governments and civil society together in a structured dialogue (European 
Commission 2011g). Moreover, the EU has established a structured dialogue strategic 
process aimed at defining and agreeing on the roles of civil society and local authorities in 
development, improving the effectiveness of their involvement in aid activities and 
exploring ways to adapt EU aid modalities to increase the impact of its development 
programmes. 
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In the light of these considerations, with creation of hybrid model within state structure at 
national level, or within the EU structure at supranational level controlling migration is 
possible because ideal hybrid types will work for the beneficiaries of both state and non-
state parts with taking into account ‘migration driving forces’ (Bauer and Zimmermann 
1995) such as remittances, labour policy (wages, employment and so forth), economic and 
political motives, symmetric and asymmetric networks. 
In the UK five year strategy for asylum and immigration report (2005), Tony Blair stated 
that: 
The challenge for the government is to maintain public confidence in the system by agreeing 
immigration where it is in the country’s interests and preventing it where it is not […] There 
will be a new drive to prevent illegal entry, to crack down on illegal working and a tough policy 
of removals for those who should not be here. There will be on-the-sp t fines for employers 
who collude with illegal immigration. We will fingerprint visitors who need visas, and those 
planning longer stays, before they arrive. We will, where necessary, use our powers to 
demand financial bonds from migrants in specific categories where there has been evidence 
of abuse, to guarantee their return home. And over time, we will move towards the point 
where it becomes the norm that those who fail can be detained, as asylum intake falls and 
removals become easier as we negotiate ever more effective returns agreements. We will 
replace out-dated and confusing rules with a clear and modern points system so we only allow 
into Britain the people and skills our economy needs. Those who want to settle permanently 
in the UK will have to show they bring long term benefits to our country. But while making the 
rules strict and workable, we will make sure we don’t slam the door on those genuine 
refugees fleeing death and persecution. 
Controlling migration is not possible with using only hard law of states towards migrants. 
Conversely, using hard law for managing migration and asylum issues may cause an incline 
at illegal migration flows. Moreover, it ought to be noted that preventing illegal migration 
covers alternative patterns that are in favour of migrants. The attempts to control the 
migration flows with hard law instruments may cause an increase in the number of illegal 
migration and cooperation of migrants with illegal networks. 
While analysing Tony Blair’s speech on immigration and asylum control and management, 
several crucial points have attracted our attention. First, Blair, a supporter of the third way 
approach, used soft power of the state with a proactive perspective. He attempted to 
minimise potential problems through using fingerprinting and preboarding electronic 
checks, requiring from migrants staying in UK for more than three months to have an ID 
card, screening visa applicants for tuberculosis on high risk routes, expanding the network of 
Airline Liaison Officers, demanding financial bonds from migrants, detaining more failed 
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asylum seekers, introducing fast track processing of all unfounded asylum seekers, with 
greater control over applicants throughout the process, preventing applicants concealing 
their identity to frustate removal, working with countries which generate the most failed 
asylum seekers to ensure that they redocument and accept back failed asylum seekers, and 
expanding voluntary returns schemes, maximising returns to safe countries and finding ways 
to return unaccompanied asylum seeking children. 
Thus, Blair preferred to use ‘gate-keeping strategy’ (Triandafyllidou 2010) instead of using 
fencing strategy. Triandafyllidou compared these two strategies as such: gate-keeping 
strategies (i.e. paper controls) aim at restricting practical legal access to a nation and its 
institutions, and fencing strategy which measures (i.e. detecting persons) actively target 
illegal migrants in order to arrest and then expel them. Recently, as a gate-keeping strategy, 
most of Western European states adopted tests and language courses as official 
precondition for immigration. This means mandatory language and country knowledge as 
precondition for immigration represent effective instrument for immigration control 
(Goodman 2011: 235). 
Controlling migration is an open debate for scholars. Castles argued that a general theory of 
migration is neither possible nor desirable. However, researchers can make significant 
progress by reembedding migration research in a more general understanding of 
contemporary society, and linking it to broader theories of social change across a range of 
social scientific disciplines (Castles 2010: 1565). Therefore, I have attempted to illustrate the 
nexus among controlling migration and hybridity in migration research. 
Reasoning hybridity in the context of controlling migration gives some clues to deal with 
forced migration. Betts (2009) came in the edge of the hybrid model, however he has 
formulated ideal type relationship as state, citizen and territory. Betts compared forced 
migration with international theories such as: neorealism, liberal institutionalism, analytical 
liberalism, the English School, constructivism and critical theory. In this context, the hybrid 
model best fits in constructivist approach which explores the role of non-state actors and 
transnational actors in world politics. 
Esping-Andersen argues that the state, the market economy and the family – a community 
archetype – are the three basic welfare pillars of society (Evers 2005). In addition, Esping-
Andersen stated that welfare states’ labour markets are embedded in the institutional 
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framework of social policy. ‘Welfare state and employment regimes not only coincide, but 
also that welfare states indeed have a direct causal impact on how employment structures 
and new axes of social conflict evolve’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). While investigating state-
employment relationship, Esping-Andersen introduced a third way, an alternative strategy. 
A politics of collectivising families’ needs (de-familialisation) frees women from unpaid 
labour, and thereby nurtures the dual-earner household. A social democratic 
defamilialisation strategy can reverse fertility decline if it helps employed mothers square 
the caring work circle and if it is willing to cover a good part of the opportunity costs of 
having children. A fundamental postindustrial dilemma is that families seem no longer 
inclined to assume the costs of bearing children. Moreover, the double-earner household 
plays the role of employment multiplier and the employment multiplier of working mothers 
can be quite substantial (Esping-Andersen 1999). In this context, I would like to remind the 
impact of migration on female migrants. In the Western Balkans and North African states, 
female migrants are increasingly leaving their country of origins due several reasons. 
Actually, Esping-Andersen’s defamilialisation strategy may help for the feminisation of 
migration. However, to improve theoretical concepts researching practical reasons is 
needed. 
Hybrid structures lay behind Esping-Andersen’s understanding and arguments which have 
implications of the impact of what is labeled as state, community and societal or market-
principles. 
Habermas argued that developing the idea of theory of society conceived with a practical 
intention. He proposed historical materialism which embraces the interrelationships of the 
theory’s own origins and application. He classified three aspects of the relation between 
theory and praxis: empirical, epistemological, and methodological aspects (Habermas 1988: 
1-3). In addition, Habermas stated that: 
The dictum on the ex post facto character of theory determines its relation to praxis. Political 
theory cannot aim at instructing the state what it should be like, but rather instead how the 
state – the moral universal – should be known (Habermas, 1988, p.178-179). Therefore, a 
convergence of the two systems (the third way) on the middle ground of a controlled mass 
democracy within the welfare state is not to be excluded. If indeed the old Utopias of the best 
possible social order and eternal peace, the highest degree of freedom and perfect happiness, 
contain the underlying rational themes of a theory, no matter how distorted into a derivative 
myth, as their implicit basis; and then praxis must legitimate itself in terms of this theory, 
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because it has now been invested with the mantle of a state ideology (Habermas, 1988, p.197-
198). 
In the light of theory and practice understanding of Habermas, two examples can help us to 
measure how hybridity may work in EU, Western Balkans and North African countries. The 
first example is a hybrid project in Heidelberg (Germany). The author of this article realised 
an in-depth interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the Foreigners’ & 
Migrants’ Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). Heidelberg Intercultural 
Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) is currently a general/real hybrid project which 
is a common platform for state, private and civil society. It has established this month (April, 
2012) and the main purpose is to include other non-state actors to this platform in order to 
deal with migrants’ integration problems, society needs and many other issues which are 
waiting for immediate solutions. During the interview, Mr. Allimadi perfectly enlightened 
me regarding the passion of the people who work in Citizen Department (Bürgeramt) and 
volunteers who participate in the project from various institutions. The project likelihood 
has the potential to create a transition from general/real hybrid project to specific/ideal 
hybrid project. Mr. Allimadi shared with me the project’s motto that is ‘problems are 
potentials.’ This is very crucial point because hybridity has state and non-state actors and 
each actor has its own problem. This means with coming together problems of some actors 
will be transformed as potentials or opportunities for other actors. This puts 
decentralisation and social transformation in a consensus of hybrid platform together. 
Togetherness, openness and solidarity are three principles of this harmony. Mr. Allimadi 
stated that ‘if you open your door to others, then you begin to live in a huge house (He 
referred to an African proverb).’ The author of this article is currently preparing a same 
hybrid project for Western Balkan countries institutions for benchmarking, embedding and 
proliferating hybridity. 
The other hybrid project is ASAN Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve 
Shqiptarë në Botë). The aim of the ASAN project is to increase engagement and integration 
of Albanian young generation who live, study and/or work abroad. ASAN network will be a 
hybrid network of young people at home country and host country. ASAN project 
participants have created an online database (www.asan.al) and rapidly increased capacity 
of the network. Just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center, ASAN project will deal with 
internal and external integration issues as well. Currently, ASAN project has a general/real 
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hybrid model image, however increasing patriotism trend of Albanians, the willingness level 
and incline of participation level will shift this image to specific/ideal hybrid model. In 
addition, objectives of the project are listed as such: benefit from intellectual property and 
energy of young ethnic Albanians; take the future of Albania under control; creation and 
coordination of youth Albanian Lobbies; increase the influence of national Albanian identity; 
establish a national online database system; provide internships and job opportunities for 
Albanian migrants; increase Albanians’ representation in world affairs; unify state and non-
state actors in a common platform; balance employment demand-supply of state and 
private sector; and unify Albanian youth with their diversities. 
 
4.1. Dialectics of Triple Win and Hybrid Model 
First of all, many scholars argued triple win solutions in the context of circular migration, i.e. 
dynamic mobility of migrants among home countries and host countries (Vertovec 2004; 
Zimmermann 2005; Katseli, Lucas and Xenogiani 2006; Vertovec 2007; Erzan 2008; Haas 
2010). Haas argued that circular migration brings positive impact for development when 
home country, host country and migrants are organised through cooperation (Haas 2010). 
Actually, this cooperation is a combination of triple win and hybridity. Despite the fact that 
state-private-civil society interactions are part of a long debate, interestingly, many scholars 
have not recognised this fact yet. For example, in the past, first Thomas More versus Niccolo 
Machiavelli had started debating on the role of the state, then this tradition was continued 
with Karl Marx versus Adam Smith with liberal-communist perspectives, the last scientific 
duello of this tradition was between Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls – arguing whether a 
social or liberal theory of justice in ideal (Kantian) or real (Hobbesian) terms will be in favour 
of goodness of society. In fact, all these scientists – including the scientists of Chicago and 
Frankfurt Schools – were not opposing to the role of all non-state actors. 
Therefore, constructing hybridity with taking into consideration these debates will shape 
hybrid model as a paradigm (in Kuhn’s terminology). Apel (2011) argued that researchers 
should start to their investigations not only with specific paradigms but also with the 
paradigms of the first philosophy that have ontological, epistemological, hermeneutic and 
phenomenological perspectives. Apel goes beyond to scientific revolutions and looks to the 
reasons with very deep research questions. Therefore, my proposal is to use hybrid model 
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as a paradigm. From triple win point of view, social scientists should strongly criticise and 
contest the researches which are focusing only on host countries’ self-interest maximisation 
without embedding hybridity. Moreover, a strategic home and host country partnership 
which does not take into account migrants’ interests should be contested as well. This study 
goes one step further and attempts to enhance the triple win solutions for three sides of 
hybrid model. 
In this context, there are interrelationships and dialectics among triple win model (home 
country, host country and migrants) and hybrid model, i.e. state-home country nexus, 
private-host country nexus and migrants-civil society nexus. If there are interrelationships 
and dialectics among six sides, then the researchers ought to seek an ideal six-sided win 
approach. Figure 9 indicates a specific/ideal hybrid model which includes many non-state 
actors. From this understanding, when a researcher puts home and host country in a zero-
sum game approach, of course a special focus would be reciprocal interaction among state 
actors. However, many non-state actors exist in both home and host countries. Social 
scientists may find a solution which balances or maximises national interests of home and 
host countries, migrants, and more importantly non-state actors in both home and host 
countries. Probably, a distinction of two things may clarify better migrants integration 
problems within societies of both home and host countries. First, researchers who examine 
ideal triple win solutions, mostly analyse state-centric migration issues. A recent debate in 
some of Western Balkan countries was regarding pensions. The issue has a high level 
complexity because it has been handled from state-centric, and bilateral dimensions. For 
instance; rather how trade unions are coordinated within home and host countries 
separately, the crucial point is how the hybridisation of trade unions as non-state actors 
within home and host countries can solve labour migration-related problems. I would like to 
call this linkage ‘interhybridity’ that may exist in states which reciprocally acts in terms of 
interhybridity. 
In the light of this considerations, hybrid model has a catalyst (katalysator) role in terms of 
balancing social problems and civil society needs. Therefore, it is better to perceive the 
hybrid model as a combination of communicative and strategic action that means the 
reciprocal recognition within the model is precondition for significant functionality. This will 
shape social relations with moral meanings of communication. 
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Habermas classified social actions as instrumental, symbolic, communicative and strategic 
actions (Habermas 1979: 40). In the context of hybrid model, communicative action and 
strategic action require more attention. He describes communicative action as ‘oriented to 
reaching understanding’, whereas strategic action as ‘oriented to the actor’s success.’ 
Habermas distinguished strategic action from communicative action with taking into 
account Kohlberg’s theory of moral development and discourse ethics in terms of 
cognitivism, universalism and formalism (Habermas 1990).  
[…] ‘communicative action’ is oriented to observing intersubjectively valid norms that link 
reciprocal expectations (recognition). In communicative action, the validity basis of speech is 
presupposed. The universal validity claims which participants at least implicitly raise and 
reciprocally recognise, make possible the consensus that carries action in common. Whereas, 
in strategic action, this background consensus is lacking […] Strategic action remains 
indifferent with respect to its motivational conditions, whereas the consensual 
presuppositions of communicative action can secure motivations. Thus, strategic actions must 
be institutionalised, i.e. embed in intersubjectively binding norms that guarantee the 
fulfilment of the motivational conditions (Habermas 1979: 118). 
Giddens supported Habermas’ communicative action theory. To achieve a  better theory-
practice nexus, Giddens created the theory of structuration which is an interaction of 
objectivism (Marx) and subjectivism (Weber). Giddens argued that from ontological point of 
view, structuration theory means ‘a conceptual investigation of the nature of human action, 
social institutions and the interrelations between action and institutions’ (Giddens 1991: 
201). In structuration theory, the core concern of the social sciences is with recurrent social 
practices and their transformations. In addition, structuration theory offers a conceptual 
action that allows one to understand both how actors are at the same time the creators of 
social systems yet created by them. Therefore, structuration theory can be a guide for a 
specific/ideal hybrid model. 
With well-structured specific/ideal hybrid models which will be embedded in migration 
research, integration and development issues will meet concrete solutions because in a 
huge platform in a big society each state and non-state actors will communicate and debate 
reciprocally and respectfully. 
To achieve ideal integration, more efforts are needed both at the EU, the national and local 
level to achieve better results (European Commission 2011a: 13). Integration requires 
efforts by the migrant and the receiving society. Migrants must be given the opportunity to 
participate in their new communities, in particular to learn the language of the receiving 
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country, to have access to employment, education and health systems, as well as to have 
the socio-economic capacity. Migrants' integration implies a balance between enjoying the 
rights and respecting the laws and cultures of the host countries. In addition, the human 
dimension of migration and development policies will also be strengthened through the 
introduction of a migrant-based approach. In this context, the role of diaspora should get 
more attention. Initiatives geared to enabling members of the diaspora to contribute to 
their country of origin should be considered, including the promotion of the temporary 
return of qualified migrants. Building upon the first positive experiences, the possibilities of 
circular migration need to be further developed (European Commission 2011a). The 
European Parliament also underlined in its recent Resolution (i.e. European Parliament 
resolution of 5 April 2011 on migration flows arising from instability: scope and role of EU 
foreign policy) the need to have a balanced and comprehensive approach. Thus, a 
specific/ideal hybrid model can be an active, comprehensive and rational strategy and/or 
policy recommendation for stabilisation and development in Western Balkans and North 
African countries. 
Circular migration from Western Balkans and North African countries to the EU member 
states poses the question that is ‘Does migration encourage development of the countries 
of origin or hider such development? Does migration cause brain gain and brain drain at 
home countries? (Castles and Miller 2009). What about this question: From postcolonialism 
point of view, does migration improve relations among postcolonial home country and 
postcoloniser host country? I raise this question because both Western Balkans and North 
Africa were colonies of European states in the past under various civilisations’ hegemony 
and hence postcolonial era brought rapid development to these regions and linked cultural 
similarities with Europe. 
Mahoney argued that: 
The view that colonialism left behind an underdeveloped periphery is widely held among 
theorists of world capitalism. Notwithstanding the patently objectionable purposes of 
colonialism, however, the countries that were born out of this traumatic experience now have 
remarkably diverse levels of development; they include some of the richest countries in the 
world as well as some of the poorest (Mahoney 2010: 253). Implications of the study are 
threefold. First, by bringing coloniser institutions back into the picture, it is possible to clarify 
disagreements about the relationship between precolonial population size and colonial 
settlement. Second, attention to coloniser differences sheds new light on debates about 
whether or not colonial settlers preferred to inhabit low-morality environments. Third, a 
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concern with coloniser identity helps make sense of over time differences in the way natural 
resource endowments historically shaped levels of colonisation (Mahoney 2010: 264-265). 
The argument of Mahoney’s work highlights how colonial countries were influenced 
negatively by colonisers during the colonial period and then how this understanding has 
been changed. Because post-colonial countries are affected positively by their former 
colonisers during the modern era. Mahoney perfectly explains this shift with Japan case. 
In developing countries, effective participation in the world economy has occurred largely only 
when the state actively stimulates and directs – and perhaps even creates do novo – 
commercial and entrepreneurial classes. This state role bears little resemblance to either the 
ideal typical mercantilist or liberal capitalist political economies. The new ‘developmental 
states’ are, instead founded on an active partnership between the state and private capital, 
one in which state actors enjoy relative autonomy from entrepreneurial classes even as they 
are deeply tied to those classes through social networks. This kind of state-society model, 
which perhaps has Japan as its exemplar, has proven most effective at achieving sustained 
high growth since the late nineteenth century. It was, in fact, Japan that endowed its two 
most important and heavily settled colonial possessions – Korea and Taiwan – with 
institutions and actors congruent with a developmental state and a state-led industrial model. 
Korea and Taiwan are the postcolonial countries that have most impressively risen toward the 
top of the world economic hierarchy since the mid-twentieth century (Mahoney 2010: 268). 
Similarly, development process in post-colonial India can be perceived in the same way 
precisely. The UK supported the Indian elite class inside the country and all around the 
world in order to accelerate the development process during post-colonial era. Fludernik 
(1998) edited a book which is entitled ‘Hybridity and Postcolonialism’ and her work 
examines how the UK influenced Indian society with the cultural power and value of English 
language. She explained evidences through looking to the Indian literature. Thus, if English 
as an element of the communicative action has the power to shaped a hybrid culture in 
societies, then other elements of communicative action such as media and family may have 
the power to shape hybridity in terms of cultural aspects as well. Cultural hybridity also have 
a significant effect on both general/real hybrid model and specific/ideal hybrid model.  
To sum up, it is assumed that embedded-hybridity in migration research better can work in 
post-soviet bloc Western Balkan countries and post-colonial North African countries. The 
specific reason for this are twofold. First, from governance perspective, the role of states 
and the existence of centralised power at the institutional structures of these states still 
exist. Second, people living in these two regions have hybrid identities and are more likely to 
be included in communicative action. Therefore, hybrid model is an effective strategy for 
social transformation of controlling migration approach. 
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5 Conclusion 
Dealing with international migration in the age of migration (Castles and Miller 2009) 
requires concrete solutions and alternative patterns. Hegel’s dialectic method might be 
applied to international migration for achieving syntheses and better outcomes. For 
instance, Hegel concluded that ‘all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real “Alles 
was wirklich ist, ist vernunftig, und alles was vernunftig ist, ist wirklich”(Hegel 1899).’ As a 
rational, real and ideal pattern, hybrid model may help to control illegal migration with a 
proactive vision and transform mala fide migration to bona fide migration form. Controlling 
migration by an ideal hybrid structure and decentralisation will create more efficient and 
accurate policies and strategies, however for convergence among EU member states, hybrid 
structures ought to be created at EU supranational level with vertical relations. With 
decentralisation within the context of state’s authority and public sphere, these structures 
will have same legitimacy and effectiveness at the EU supranational level, and thus EU may 
improve its common migration and asylum policies in this way. 
Empirical findings of the research have alarmed for the need of moral consciousness in 
migration turbulence (particularly for the Arab Spring migration flows) through controlling 
mechanisms and good migration governance within the framework of hybrid model. The 
rise of forced migration and pushing factors prepared a ground for researchers to improve 
migrant-based approach with collection of migrants’ narratives. Empirical results are not 
just simple numbers, thus these should be investigated with migrants’ narratives analyses. 
Narratives of migrants in Western Balkan countries are lessons and recommendations for 
the migrants of North African countries. In this context, hybrid model is a platform in which 
people share their experiences, and therefore hybridity increase equal opportunity and 
active participation, enhance engagement of migrants to diaspora events and ethnic 
enclaves, maximise benefits and minimise negative effects, and enhance the humane of 
migration from a holistic perspective. Hybrid model will enhance communicative action 
among home, transit and host countries and develop mechanisms for these countries to 
facilitate the exchange of information, create ground for networking and ensure a 
communication platform. With a specific focus to migrants-civil society dialectic, hybridity 
will create social and competitive harmony and transform win-lose philosophy to ‘To love or 
to be loved’ philosophy and realise the feminisation of migration. 
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The role of the EU is to help Western Balkans and North African countries to keep up 
realising reforms in various areas. The Western Balkans and North African counties’ 
migration flows to the EU can be decreased with the European Union stabilisation and 
integration reforms, enlargement and neighbourhood policy and the Stabilisation 
Association Process. These reciprocal communication will balance the European Union 
relations with eastern countries which have multi-dimentional (economic, politic, religious 
etc.) nexus with Western Balkans and North African countries. Obviously, it can be claimed 
that partnership and solidarity with Western Balkans and North African countries have 
significant influences for achievement of the EU 2020 targets and hence integration of 
Western Balkans within the EU and stabilisation of North African countries will be a driving 
force for the EU. With respect to EU 2020 targets, high skilled workers of these countries are 
seen as potentials or opportunities, whereas asylum seekers of these countries are seen as 
threats or potential problems. Therefore, the European Commission is working on how to 
attract high skilled labour migrants in order to balance the need of 20 million high skilled 
workers over next years (Weiner and Munz 1997; Martin 2003; Brady 2008; Davoudi, 
Wishardt and Strange 2010). Both two hybrid case – i.e. the Heidelberg Intercultural Center 
and ASAN – are strategic models for European Commission to support such projects in order 
to attract high skilled labour migrants and improve employment policies. 
The convergence of the EU member states’ national interests is needed in order to increase 
the effectiveness of a common EU migration policy. Hopefully, non-state actors are ensuring 
various scientific routes for solving migration issues in different alternatives. The 
involvement of non-state actors to hybrid model will support capacity building and active 
networking. In addition, a more civilised European society can enhance the moral 
responsibility towards dealing with migration issues. A more civilised European society will 
have willingness to open its borders to non-EU citizens (i.e. the citizens of Western Balkan 
and North African countries). Increasing moral values and judgements will make the real 
beneficiaries of the free movement of persons and workers all Europeans. Only if the 
migration policies and regulations reformulate with taking into consideration moral values 
and judgements, they can be more effective and global. 
Eventually, moralisation of migration matters is possible with creating hybrid structures and 
hybrid forms can provide definite solutions in various aspects and controlling migration can 
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transform socially the migration process in favour of migrants and society as well as state 
and non-state actors. Dreaming a world without migrants in the age of migration is an 
utopia (or absolut spirit), however dreaming a world with engaged migrants within societies 
with minimum problems is not only rational but also real. 
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Annex 
Table A1: Total Visa statistics 2009 
Schengen States Schengen visas 
(Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas) 
Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued Number of visas issued Non issuance rate 
AT 285.196 5,23% 27.169 
BE 165.474 17,38% 24.588 
CH 351.578 8,70% 37.975 
CZ 440.360 3,74% 17.109 
DE 1.491.784 9,06% 139.640 
DK 77.142 5,40% 1.037 
EE 93.464 2,49% 399 
EL 598.883 4,68% 40.686 
ES 748.466 9,97% 135.568 
FI 783.340 1,58% - 
FR 1.415.886 12,35% 167.108 
HU 272.972 4,14% 8.530 
IS 779 4,18% 88 
IT 1.053.354 5,02% 155.286 
LT 236.299 1,77% 2.824 
LU 5.364 2,38% 27 
LV 118.436 3,48% 1.450 
MT 28.915 9,31% 4.168 
NL 313.534 7,37% 9.032 
NO 105.430 0,75% 16.502 
PL 579.424 3,29% 210.292 
PT 107.224 6,87% 15.800 
SE 172.595 7,62% 527 
SI 97.690 4,19% 391 
SK 62.287 3,78% 1.982 
UE Member States not 
applying yet fully the 
Schengen acquis 
Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued 
Number of visas issued Non issuance rate 
BG 595.914 1,05% 8.575 
CY 113.205 2,63% - 
RO 175.956 3,24% 12.831 
Totals Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay visas Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued 
Number of visas issued Non issuance rate 
Sub-total Schengen 9.605.876 7,11% 1.018.178 
Sub-total non Schengen 885.075 1,70% 21.406 
Total 10.490.951 6,68% 1.039.584 
Source: European Commission, 2011, p.21 
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Table A2: Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data and 2003-2010 
Remittances (millions of US$) According to World Bank Data 
 
 
The Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data (World Bank Database) 
Albania            
Indicator Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
17.45868 
          
Net migration -270245 
    
-72243 
    
-47889 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
523 292 17 26 51 56 56 77 65 70 76 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
6802 7626 10761 10385 10478 12722 14079 15340 15006 15711 14772 
International migrant stock, 
total 
76695 
    
82668 
    
89106 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
2.496699 
    
2.631231 
    
2.780839651 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 89106 
Host Country: 1438451 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Greece, Italy, Germany, the UK and France 
1438.3 thousands, 45.4% of 
total population (2.83 
million, Instat 2011) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 53.1% 
89.1 thousands, 2.8% of 
total population 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
20.30026 
          
Net migration 281795 
    
61825 
    
-10000 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
38152 32745 28022 22517 22215 10568 10318 7367 7257 7132 7016 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
474981 447321 406326 300006 228815 109930 199946 78273 74366 70018 63004 
International migrant stock, 
total 
96001 
    
35141 
    
27780 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
2.599048 
    
0.92941 
    
0.73880051 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 27780 
Host Country: 1460639 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and Italy 
1461.0 thousands, 
38.9% of total population 
(3.8 million, 2011) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 50.3% 
27.8 thousands, 0.7% of 
total population 
Kosovo** 
**World Bank migration data are not available for the Republic of Kosovo. However, total number of bilateral migrant stocks for host 
country is; 25251 and Top destination countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK. According to UNDP Kosovo Remittance Study 
2010 the total amount of remittances received in 2009 was 442.7 million Euros, 11 percent of the overall GDP in year 2009. 
Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
29.38359           
Net migration -9000     -4000     2000 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
9050 4363 2816 193 1004 1274 1240 1235 1672 1542 1398 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
2176 12197 8072 5982 5104 8600 7940 8077 7521 7926 7889 
International migrant stock, 
total 
125665     120288     129701 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
6.254819     5.901941     6.294444771 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 129701  
Host Country: 447137  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and France 
447.1 thousand, 21.9% of 
total population (2 million, 
2010) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 58.3% 
129.7 thousands, 6.3% 
of total population 
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Montenegro 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
           
Net migration -32450 
    
-20632 
    
-2508 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum       
6926 8528 24741 24019 16364 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin       
135 557 1283 2582 3246 
International migrant stock, 
total      
54583 
    
42509 
International migrant stock (% 
of population)      
8.709048 
    
6.731539692 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population 
censuses of individual countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 42509 
Host Country: 36 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Denmark and Hungary 0.0 thousands 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 61.5% 
42.5 thousands, 6.8% of 
total population (0.63 
million, 2010) 
Serbia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
           
Net migration -147889 
    
-338544 
    
0 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
484391 400304 354402 291403 276683 148264 98997 97995 96739 86351 73608 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
146748 144231 323335 296632 237032 189989 174027 
16564
3 
18593
5 
19562
6 
183289 
International migrant stock, 
total 
856763 
    
674612 
    
525388 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
11.39866 
    
9.066428 
    
7.204424665 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 525388  
Host Country: 130844  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Austria, France and Denmark 
196.0 thousands, 2.0% of 
total population (7.3 
million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 56.7% 
525.4 thousands, 5.3% 
of total population 
Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) 
Albania 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 598 699 734 889 1161 1290 1359 1468 1495 1317 1285 
Workers' remittances 531 615 643 778 1028 1161 1176 1305 1226 1090 
 
Compensation of employees 67 84 90 111 132 129 184 163 270 227 
 
Migrants' transfer 
           
Outward remittance flows 
   
4 5 7 27 10 16 10 
 
Workers' remittances 
   
0 0 
 
0 
    
Compensation of employees 
   
4 5 7 27 10 16 9 
 
Migrants' transfer 
           For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.9 bn, net ODA received US$0.4 bn, total international reserves US$2.4 bn, exports of goods and services US$3.8 bn in 2008. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 1595 1521 1526 1749 2072 2043 2157 2700 2735 2167 2228 
Workers' remittances 950 919 956 1143 1474 1467 1589 1947 1899 1432  
Compensation of employees 631 581 540 595 579 570 560 739 828 643  
Migrants' transfer 26 25 30 11 19 5 8 13 8 6  
Outward remittance flows 2 11 14 20 62 40 55 65 70 61  
Workers' remittances 
 
5 7 10 49 28 41 50 53 46  
Compensation of employees 2 6 7 11 13 12 14 15 17 15  
Migrants' transfer 
          
 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$1.1 bn, net ODA received US$0.5 bn, total international reserves US$3.5 bn, exports of goods and services US$6.8 bn in 2008. 
Kosovo** Remittance data are currently not available for Kosovo.  
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Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 81 73 106 174 213 227 267 345 407 401 414 
Workers' remittances 80 68 92 146 161 169 198 239 266 260  
Compensation of employees 0 5 14 28 52 57 69 106 140 121  
Migrants' transfer 
   
        
Outward remittance flows 14 21 23 16 16 16 18 25 33 26  
Workers' remittances 14 21 23 15 15 14 16 22 28 22  
Compensation of employees 
  
1 1 1 2 2 3 5 4  
Migrants' transfer            
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.6 bn, net ODA received US$0.2 bn, total international reserves US$2.1 bn, exports of goods and services US$5.0 bn in 2008. 
Montenegro Remittance data are currently not available for Montenegro.  
Serbia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 1132* 1698* 2089* 2661 4129 4650 4703 5377 5538 5406 558 
Workers' remittances    
    
2948 2913 3755  
Compensation of employees    
    
148 191 184  
Migrants' transfer    
    
2 2 3  
Outward remittance flows    
    
114 138 91  
Workers' remittances    
    
95 114 70  
Compensation of employees    
    
17 23 20  
Migrants' transfer    
    
2 1 1  
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$3.0 bn, net ODA received US$1.0 bn, total international reserves US$11.5 bn, exports of goods and services US$14.8 bn in 2008. 
*Serbia and Montenegro 
Source: The World Bank 2008; The World Bank 2011 
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Table A3: Comparison of the EU IPA Assistance for the Western Balkan Countries 
 
 
Albania 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 56.52 38.66 15% 
Public Administration Reform 43.15 38.66 15% 
Transport 49.06 51.55 20% 
Environment and Climate Change 80.12 51.55 20% 
Social Development 13.40 25.77 10% 
Rural Development/Agriculture 17.20 51.55 20% 
TOTAL 259.45 257.74 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 84.30 85.99 87.45 
Cross-border Cooperation 10.13 10.28 10.67 
TOTAL 94.43 96.27 98.12 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 38.64 55.00 17.5 % 
Public Administration Reform 51.55 40.00 12.7 % 
Private Sector Development 28.10 50.00 15.9 % 
Transport 22.30 35.00 11.1 % 
Environment and Climate Change 72.70 54.22 17.3 % 
Social Development 46.75 40.00 12.7 % 
Acquis related and other Actions 52.54 40.00 12.7 % 
TOTAL 312.58 314.22 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 102.68 104.67 106.87 
Cross-border Cooperation 4.75 4.80 4.94 
TOTAL 107.43 109.47 111.81 
Kosovo 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 78.50 (18.46%) 61.09 30 % 
Private Sector Development 192.93 (45.38 %) 97.75 48 % 
Public Administration Reform 106.22 (24.98%) 20.35 10 % 
Other 47.55 (11.18%) 24.42 12 % 
TOTAL 425.20 203.61 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 65.83 67.07 70.71 
Cross-border Cooperation 2.87 2.93 2.99 
TOTAL 68.70 70.00 73.70 
Macedonia 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Public Administration Reform 28.00 21.33 7 % 
Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights 44.00 24.38 8 % 
Private Sector Development 45.50 45.71 15% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 46.40 67.04 22 % 
Transport 52.50 60.95 20% 
Environment and Climate Change 28.30 54.85 18% 
Social Development 37.30 30.47 10% 
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TOTAL 282.00 304.76 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 28.80 28.20 27.94 
Cross-border Cooperation 5.12 5.18 5.24 
Regional Development 39.30 42.30 51.80 
Human Resources Development 8.80 10.38 11.20 
Rural Development 16.00 19.00 21.03 
TOTAL 98.02 105.07 117.21 
Montenegro 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 17.85 7.30 8% 
Public Administration 21.65 10.04 11% 
Environment and Climate Change 14.80 22.82 25% 
Transport 16.20 18.26 20% 
Social development 8.63 9.13 10% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 8.10 14.60 16% 
Ad hoc measures 8.11 9.13 10% 
TOTAL 106.54 91.28 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 29843599 21585429 49.05% 
Cross-border Cooperation 4310344 9257238 12.94% 
Regional Development 0 23200000 22.13% 
Social Development 0 5757077 5.49% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 0 10900000 10.40% 
TOTAL 34153943 70699744 100.00% 
Serbia 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 42.00 75.00 12% 
Public Administration Reform 89.00 75.00 12% 
Social Development 96.00 75.00 12% 
Private Sector Development 34.00 75.00 12% 
Transport 71.00 75.00 12% 
Environment, Climate Change and Energy 93.00 99.00 16% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 34.00 75.00 12% 
Other EU Acquis and Horizontal Activities 120.00 75.00 12% 
TOTAL 579.00 624.00 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 190.00 194.00 203.00 
Cross-border Cooperation 12.00 12.00 12.00 
TOTAL 202.00 206.00 215.00 
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Table A4: Comparison of the North African Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data and 2003-2010 Remittances 
(millions of US$) According to World Bank Data 
 
 
The North African Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data (World Bank Database) 
Algeria            
Indicator Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 9,512722           
Net migration -140000     -140000     -140000 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 169656 169422 169233 169033 169048 94101 94180 94137 94093 94137 94144 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 8034 8419 12091 11667 10691 12041 8353 10615 9060 8185 6689 
International migrant stock, 
total 250110     242446     242324 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 0,819124     0,737177     0,683215 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 242324  
Host Country: 1211118 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Germany and the UK 
1,211.1 thousands, 
3.4% of total population 
(34.9 million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 45.2% 
242.3 thousands, 0.7% 
of total population 
Egypt           
 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
4,671608957           
Net migration -945704     -370780     -346922 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
6840 7230 80494 88749 90343 88946 88022 97556 97861 94406 95056 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
3953 4678 6442 5735 5376 6291 7613 6799 6780 6990 6913 
International migrant stock, 
total 
169149     246745     244714 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
0,25004132     0,33252602     0,301665127 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 244714 
Host Country: 3741055  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Italy 
3,739.1 thousands, 
4.4% of total population 
(83 million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 46.6% 
244.7 thousands, 0.3% 
of total population 
Libya            
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
4,315018           
Net migration -20300     -20300     -20300 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 
11543 11664 11666 11897 12166 12166 2760 4098 6713 9005 7923 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 
619 888 1455 1570 1720 1575 1573 1954 2084 2202 2309 
International migrant stock, 
total 
558770     617536     682482 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 
10,68151     10,70307     10,7391 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 682482  
Host Country: 110080   
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: The UK, Germany and Italy 
110.1 thousands, 1.7% 
of total population (6.4 
million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 35.5% 
682.5 thousands, 10.4% 
of total population 
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Morocco            
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 18,59199 
          Net migration -500000     -614000     -675000 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 2105 2091 2127 2121 2121 219 503 786 766 773 792 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 392 363 1268 1291 1318 2920 4710 4039 3533 2286 2284 
International migrant stock, 
total 53124     51020     49098 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 0,184502     0,167871     0,153665 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 49098  
Host Country: 3016631  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany 
3,016.6 thousands, 
9.3% of total population 
(32 million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 49.7% 
49.1 thousands, 0.2% of 
total population 
Tunisia            
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 12,63446           
Net migration -55624     -80599     -20000 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of asylum 436 97 102 99 90 87 93 101 94 92 89 
Refugee population by country 
or territory of origin 1207 1368 2542 2563 2518 3129 2844 2507 2349 2260 2174 
International migrant stock, 
total 36221     34881     33591 
International migrant stock (% 
of population) 0,378742     0,347801     0,318425 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from 
population censuses of individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 33591  
Host Country: 651737   
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: France, Italy, Germany and Belgium 
651.6 thousands, 6.3% 
of total population 
(10.4 million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 49.3% 
33.6 thousands, 0.3% of 
total population 
Comparison of the North African Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) 
Algeria 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 (estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 790 670 1070 1750 2460 1950 2527 
(a) 
2906 2202 2059 2031 
Workers' remittances .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Outward remittance flows .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Workers' remittances .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer            (a): 2.2% of GDP in 2006 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$2.6 bn, net ODA received US$0.3 bn, total international reserves US$148.1 bn, exports of goods and services US$79.1 bn in 2008. 
Egypt            
Inward remittance flows 2852 2911 2893 2961 3341 5017 5330 7656 8694 7150 7681 
Workers' remittances 2852 2911 2893 2961 3341 5017 5330 
(a) 
7656 8694 7150 .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Outward remittance flows 32 35 14 79 13 57 135 180 241 255 .. 
Workers' remittances 32 35 14 79 13 57 135 (b) 180 241 255 .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(a): 5.0% of GDP in 2006; (b): 0.1% of GDP in 2006 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$9.5 bn, net ODA received US$1.3 bn, total international reserves US$34.3 bn, exports of goods and services US$53.8 bn in 2008. 
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Libya            
Inward remittance flows 9 10 7 8 10 15 16 (a) 16 16 14 16 
Workers' remittances 6 5 3 3 5 7 6 .. .. .. .. 
Compensation of employees 3 5 4 5 5 8 10 .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Outward remittance flows 463 683 694 676 790 914 945 (b) 762 964 1,000 .. 
Workers' remittances 454 675 776 644 940 854 880 762 964 .. .. 
Compensation of employees 9 8 10 32 35 60 65 .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(a):0.03% of GDP in 2006; (b): 1.9% of GDP in 2006 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$4.1 bn, net ODA received US$0.1 bn, total international reserves US$96.3 bn, exports of goods and services US$62.8 bn in 2008. 
Morocco            
Inward remittance flows 2161 3261 2877 3614 4221 4590 5451 
(a) 
6730 6895 6271 6447 
Workers' remittances 2161 3261 2877 3614 4221 4589 5451 6730 6894 6271 .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer 0 .. .. .. .. 0 .. .. 1 .. .. 
Outward remittance flows 29 36 36 44 42 40 41 (b) 52 58 61 .. 
Workers' remittances 23 27 30 34 34 35 38 49 54 60 .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Migrants' transfer 6 9 6 10 8 5 3 3 3 1 .. 
(a): 9.5% of GDP in 2006; (b): 0.1% of GDP in 2006 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$2.5 bn, net ODA received US$1.2 bn, total international reserves US$22.7 bn, exports of goods and services US$32.6 bn in 2008. 
Tunisia            
Inward remittance flows 796 927 1071 1250 1431 1393 1510 1716 1977 1966 1960 
Workers' remittances 796 927 1071 1107 1268 1195 1304 1446 1725 1,727 .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. 143 163 198 206 269 252 238 .. 
Migrants' transfer .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Outward remittance flows 27 24 20 17 13 16 16 15 16 13 .. 
Workers' remittances 21 21 13 11 7 7 7 7 6 .. .. 
Compensation of employees .. .. .. 7 6 8 10 8 10 .. .. 
Migrants' transfer 6 3 8 7 6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
(a): 5.0% of GDP in 2006; (b): 0.1% of GDP in 2006 
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$2.6 bn, net ODA received US$0.5 bn, total international reserves US$9.0 bn, exports of goods and services US$24.6 bn in 2008. 
Source: The World Bank 2008 and 2011 
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